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Cross-Sectional Challenges: Gender, Race, and SixPerson Juries
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After two grand juries failed to indict the police officers that killed Michael
Brown and Eric Garner in 2014, our nation has engaged in polarizing
discussions about how juries reach their decision. The very legitimacy of our
justice system has come into question. Increasingly, deep concerns have been
raised regarding the role of race and gender in jury decision-making in such
controversial cases. Tracing the roots of juror decision-making is especially
complicated when jurors’ race and gender are factored in as considerations.
This Article relies on social science research to explore the many cross-sectional
challenges involved in the jurors’ decision-making in the George Zimmerman
case. To analyze how the Zimmerman jurors’ race and gender may have affected
their decision-making in the case, this Article presents empirical studies
evaluating the effect of race and gender on juror decision-making in criminal
cases. The aim of this Article is to create dialogue about an important challenge
for our justice system: How can we fulfill the constitutional mandate that juries
be diverse? How can we overcome the barriers to fulfilling this ideal? This
Article’s suggestions also include focusing on the prosecutor’s special obligations
to serve justice by selecting a jury that adequately represents the community from
which it is drawn. These and other changes are crucial to ensuring that
communities accept even the most controversial jury decisions as legitimate.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 26, 2012, twenty-eight-year-old neighborhood watch
coordinator George Zimmerman shot and killed Trayvon Martin in
Sanford, Florida, a suburb of Orlando.1 Martin, a seventeen-year-old
boy, had been returning from a snack run when he encountered

1

Lizette Alvarez, Justice Department Investigation Is Sought in Florida Teenager’s
Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
03/17/us/justice-department-investigation-is-sought-in-florida-teenagers-shootingdeath.html; Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, Shooting Focuses Attention on a
Program That Seeks to Avoid Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/trayvon-martin-death-spotlightsneighborhood-watch-groups.html.
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Zimmerman.2 Martin was not armed.3 Nearly two months later, after
much political turmoil, George Zimmerman was charged with second
degree murder.4 In July of 2013, a jury acquitted Zimmerman of all
charges related to Martin’s death.5
Widespread protests greeted the jury’s verdict in this case.6
Commentators questioned the jurors’ objectivity,7 their understanding
of the case,8 and whether or not they were racially biased.9 The first
juror to speak publicly about the verdict was a White woman
interviewed by CNN just days after the verdict was announced. Her
interview added to the public sentiment that the verdict may have been
biased by reinforcing racial tropes about the criminally violent threat
posed by Martin.10 Many commentators have ignored the multiple
factors at work in this particular case. This Article examines the jury’s
verdict in light of social science research on jury decision-making,
including the work on gender and racial dynamics in the context of

2

Kara Dapena, Timeline of Events: Seven Deadly Minutes, MIAMI HERALD (May 23,
2012), http://media.miamiherald.com/static/Trayvon%20Timeline/
TrayvonMapNew19.swf.
3
Alvarez, supra note 1.
4
Lizette Alvarez & Michael Cooper, Prosecutor Files Charge of 2nd-degree Murder in
Shooting of Martin, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
04/12/us/zimmerman-to-be-charged-in-trayvon-martin-shooting.html.
5
Manuel Roig-Franzia, Zimmerman Found Not Guilty in Killing of Trayvon Martin,
WASH. POST (July 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/zimmermantrial-jurors-request-clarification-on-manslaughter-instructions/2013/07/
13/3a26dbbe-ec0c-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html.
6
Michael Pearson et al., Verdict Doesn’t End Debate in Trayvon Martin Death, CNN
(July 16, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/15/justice/zimmerman-verdictprotests/.
7
Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Opinion, Zimmerman Trial Juror b37 Reconfirms Glaring
Juror Racial Bias, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
earl-ofari-hutchinson/zimmerman-trial-juror-b37_b_3611614.html.
8
Former federal prosecutor Tanya Miller said: “What is really clear when we hear
this juror [identified as B-29] speak is that she really misunderstood the law. She did
not appropriately apply the law to the facts because she didn’t understand it.” The
Situation Room (CNN television broadcast July 26, 2013) (transcript available at
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1307/26/sitroom.01.html).
9
See, e.g., Richard Gabriel, Opinion, Race, Bias, and the Zimmerman Jury, CNN (July
16, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/16/opinion/gabriel-bias-zimmerman/;
William Saletan, Opinion, Jury Rigged: Did Racism Skew the Zimmerman Verdict?, SLATE
(July 17, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/
2013/07/zimmerman_jury_bias_did_racism_or_stand_your_ground_skew_the_verdi
ct.html.
10
Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees (CNN television broadcast July 15 & 16, 2013)
(transcripts available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
1307/15/acd.01.html and http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1307/
16/acd.01.html).
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six-person juries. We argue that the Zimmerman verdict is the product
of several intersecting factors at play in this case and cannot be
singularly attributed to any one of them.
Part I of the Article details the crime itself, including the law
enforcement response and the trial. The second part of the Article
discusses “stand your ground” statutes, which received significant
attention in the wake of Martin’s killing. In an effort to analyze how
the Zimmerman jurors’ race and gender may have affected their
decision-making in the case, Part III details a host of systematic
empirical studies evaluating how race and gender affect juror decisionmaking in criminal cases. Part III also examines the empirical research
on group decision-making dynamics, including impacts of jury size.
Part IV analyzes the constitutional requirement that juries be diverse
and the barriers to fulfilling this ideal. This part also argues that
intersectionality theory helps explain the jury’s decision-making in
controversial cases like Zimmerman’s, as well as public and media
reactions to the verdicts. The Article concludes by calling for stronger
measures to ensure a fair cross-section of communities is represented
on juries. This includes recognition of the distinct obligations of the
prosecutor to serve justice by selecting a jury that adequately
represents the community from which it is drawn. Above and beyond
the case-specific constitutional imperatives that are served by
representative juries, the measures this Article calls for are crucial to
ensuring that communities accept even the most controversial jury
decisions as legitimate.
I. A CONFRONTATION ON A RAINY SUNDAY NIGHT
A. The Accounts
Using eyewitness accounts and cell phone records, the Miami
Herald reconstructed the events leading up to Trayvon Martin’s
death.11 According to that reconstructed version, at approximately
6:24 PM, Martin, who was five feet eleven inches and 158 pounds, left
the local 7-11 store where he went to purchase snacks.12 Martin had
been staying with his father, Tracy Martin, and his father’s girlfriend,
in a Sanford gated community, the Retreat at Twin Lakes, where
George Zimmerman also lived.13 As Martin walked back to his father’s
home, he chatted on the cellphone with a friend.14 At 7:09 PM, George
11
12
13
14

Dapena, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Zimmerman called 911 from his SUV to report a “suspicious teenager”
walking near the clubhouse of the housing development.15
Zimmerman, who was the neighborhood watch coordinator,16 was not
on patrol when he first saw Martin, but rather was on a run to the
store.17 At the time, Zimmerman had a Kel Tec nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun in his possession, which he always wore holstered
while on neighborhood patrols.18 At 7:11 PM, Zimmerman pursued
Martin on foot for about fifteen seconds, then was advised by the 911
operator to stop.19 Zimmerman responded that he would stop the
pursuit.20 After a back-and-forth conversation with the police who
indicated they were on their way, Zimmerman asked the police to call
him when they arrived at the development’s entrance.21 Two and a half
minutes after Zimmerman’s call to police ended, Martin’s call with his
friend was dropped.22 At 7:16 PM, a neighbor called 911 because she
heard someone outside crying for help.23 Seconds later, a gunshot was
heard prompting six more neighbors to call 911.24 At 7:17 PM, the first
police officer arrived to find Trayvon Martin shot, just 200 feet from
his father’s backyard.25 Paramedics pronounced Martin dead at 7:30
PM.26 When the police arrived, George Zimmerman claimed that he
had shot Trayvon Martin in self-defense.27 Because Florida has a “stand
your ground” law, which alters the common law duty to retreat before
justified use of deadly force,28 Sanford police did not arrest
Zimmerman at the scene.29 The Seminole County prosecutor, under
whose jurisdiction it was to prosecute the crime, conducted an inquiry
into the incident on February 26, 2012 and declined to prosecute.30

15

Id.
Id.
17
Dapena, supra note 2.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Dapena, supra note 2.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Greg Botelho, What Happened the Night Trayvon Martin Died, CNN (May 23,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/justice/florida-teen-shooting-details/.
28
FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2005), amended by 2014 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2014195
§ 4 (West); see infra notes 56–65 and accompanying text.
29
Id.
30
Alvarez & Cooper, supra note 4.
16
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After nationwide protests31 and social media outcry,32 the Justice
Department launched an investigation.33 Florida governor Rick Scott
appointed a special prosecutor34 in the case, and on April 11, 2012,
Zimmerman was charged with second degree murder.35
Florida’s second degree murder statute provides:
The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated by
any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a
depraved mind regardless of human life, although without
any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular
individual, is murder in the second degree and constitutes a
felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a
term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082,
s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.36
Zimmerman entered a plea of not guilty.37 The trial started in June of
2013, just over a year later.38
B. The Trial
On June 10, 2013, Zimmerman’s trial began with jury selection.39
The jury that heard the case was comprised of five White women and
one Hispanic woman;40 five of the six were mothers.41 Defense attorney
31

Trayvon Martin Rallies Spread Across the United States—In Pictures, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2012/mar/27/
trayvon-martin-marches-across-us-pictures.
32
Matt Gutman & Seni Tienabeso, Interest in Trayvon Martin Shooting Spurred by
NEWS
(Mar.
21,
2012),
Celebrity
Tweets
and
Petition,
ABC
http://abcnews.go.com/US/celebrity-tweets-petitions-spur-trayvon-martin-shootingprobe/story?id=15970224.
33
Justice Department, FBI to Probe Florida Teen’s Death, CNN (Mar. 19, 2012, 9:23 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/19/justice/florida-teen-shooting/.
34
Gov. Rick Scott Appoints Special Prosecutor for Trayvon Martin Case, TAMPA BAY TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/gubernatorial/gov-rickscott-appoints-special-prosecutor-for-trayvon-martin-case/1221406.
35
Alvarez & Cooper, supra note 4.
36
FLA. STAT. § 782.04(2) (2010), amended by FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2012) and FLA.
STAT. § 782.04 (2014).
37
Zimmerman’s Not Guilty Plea Flew Under the Radar, CBS NEWS (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/zimmermans-not-guilty-plea-flew-under-the-radar/.
38
Richard Luscombe, Jury Selection Begins in George Zimmerman Trial, THE GUARDIAN
(June
10,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/10/georgezimmerman-trayvon-martin-trial-begins.
39
Id.
40
Cara Buckley, 6 Female Jurors Are Selected for Zimmerman Trial, N.Y. TIMES (June
20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/us/6-female-jurors-are-selected-forzimmerman-trial.html?_r=0.
41
Alyssa Newcomb, George Zimmerman Juror Says ‘In Our Hearts, We Felt He Was
Guilty,’ ABC NEWS (July 25, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmermanjuror-murder/story?id=19770659.
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Don West’s opening statement quickly revealed the difficulty of
selecting unbiased jurors for this controversial and well-publicized
case. West told the following joke:
“Knock. Knock,” West said.
“Who’s there?”
“George Zimmerman.”
“George Zimmerman who?”
“Ah, good. You’re on the jury.”42
West’s joke implied that jurors who had been selected were rather
simple-minded or out-of-touch, and thus unaware of this highly
publicized case.43 In striking contrast to this characterization, the
jurors’ job as decision makers in this particular trial was especially
challenging.44 First, the nation closely watched this trial.45 The media
extensively covered every aspect of the trial, from the selection of
jurors to the pronouncement of the verdict.46 Jurors must have been
aware of the weight of their decision, as the HLN network televised
each day of the trial.47 There was also the issue of keeping straight the
evidence, a complication that comes with more contested or more

42

George Zimmerman Trial Opens with Curses, Knock-Knock Joke, NEWS 13 (June 24,
2013, 6:41 PM), http://mynews13.com/content/news/cfnews13/news/
article.html/content/news/articles/cfn/2013/6/24/opening_statements_t.html.
43
See Jelani Cobb, George Zimmerman’s Trial Begins, With a Knock-Knock Joke, THE
NEW YORKER (June 24, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/georgezimmermans-trial-begins-with-a-knock-knock-joke.
44
See Patrik Jonsson, Zimmerman Trial: For Jury, Anguished Task to Resolve Death of
SCI.
MONITOR
(July
12,
2013),
Trayvon
Martin,
CHRISTIAN
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2013/0712/Zimmerman-trial-For-juryanguished-task-to-resolve-death-of-Trayvon-Martin.
45
Erin Donaghue, “We Want Peace for Trayvon:” Miami Community Leaders Call for
Calm Ahead of George Zimmerman Verdict, CBS NEWS (July 10, 2013),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/we-want-peace-for-trayvon-miami-communityleaders-call-for-calm-ahead-of-george-zimmerman-verdict/.
46
See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Running, a Fight and Then a Shot, a Witness Testifies in
Zimmerman’s Trial, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/
26/us/witness-portrays-zimmerman-as-neighborhoods-eyes-and-ears.html?_r=0; Erin
Donaghue, George Zimmerman Trial: Trayvon Martin “Viciously Attacked” Former
Neighborhood Watch Volunteer, Defense Says in Opening Statement, CBS NEWS (June 24,
2013),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-zimmerman-trial-trayvon-martinviciously-attacked-former-neighborhood-watch-volunteer-defense-says-in-openingstatement/; Dana Ford, Juror: ‘No Doubt’ That George Zimmerman Feared for His Life, CNN
(July 16, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/15/justice/zimmerman-juror-book/.
47
Eric Kelsey, Gavel-to-Gavel Zimmerman Trial Coverage Hints at CNN’s New Path,
REUTERS (July 13, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/us-usa-floridashooting-television-idUSBRE96C05D20130713.
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complex cases.48
Over the course of the month-long trial,49
approximately sixty witnesses testified.50 The witnesses ranged from
Martin’s and Zimmerman’s mothers51 to medical personnel who
treated Zimmerman,52 and to dueling audio experts who testified
about the source of the scream heard by neighbors.53 The crime had
no eyewitnesses.54 On July 13, 2013, after sixteen and a half hours of
deliberation, the jury acquitted Zimmerman of all charges.55
II. “STAND YOUR GROUND” LAWS
Much of the intellectual controversy among legal scholars that
followed the trial involved worries that the jury’s verdict was too heavily
influenced by Florida’s “stand your ground” law.56 Many jurisdictions
have enacted “stand your ground” or “make my day” laws which alter
the common law by taking away the duty to retreat.57 Rather than
acting as a defense, these laws provide immunity from criminal
prosecution or tort immunity to the individual who defends him or
herself in the proper set of circumstances.58 Under the common law,
48

See Matthew A. Reiber & Jill D. Weinberg, The Complexity of Complexity: An
Empirical Study of Juror Competence in Civil Cases, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 929, 963 (2010) (“The
survey results . . . show that comprehension declines as factual complexity increases.”).
49
See George Zimmerman Case Timeline, NEWS 13, http://mynews13.com/trayvontimeline.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).
50
List of Witnesses Called in the George Zimmerman Trial, NEWS 13 (July 10, 2013),
http://mynews13.com/content/news/cfnews13/news/article.html/content/news/a
rticles/cfn/2013/6/28/george_zimmerman_wit.html.
51
See Greg Botelho et al., Mom vs. Mom as Martin, Zimmerman Mothers Differ on 911
Call Screams, CNN (July 5, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/05/justice/georgezimmerman-trial/.
52
List of Witnesses Called in the George Zimmerman Trial, supra note 50.
53
Id.
54
See id.
55
Dana Ford, A Verdict and More: Get Caught Up on the George Zimmerman Case, CNN
(July 15, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/14/justice/zimmerman-recap/.
56
See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, The Value of Life: Constitutional Limits on Citizens Use
of Deadly Force, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 623 (2014); Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an
Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the
Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271,
287 (2012); Elizabeth B. Megale, Disaster Averted: Reconciling the Desire for a Safe and
Secure State with the Grim Realities of Stand Your Ground, 37 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 255, 314
(2013); Nirej Sekhon, The Pedagogical Prosecutor, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 2 (2014); cf.
Elizabeth Berenguer Megale, A Call for Change: A Contextual-Configurative Analysis of
Florida’s ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws, U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2397887 (arguing that “stand
your ground” makes little if any difference in this and other self-defense cases).
57
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2007).
58
Elizabeth Bosek et al., 16 FLA. JUR 2D Criminal Law—Substantive
Principles/Offenses § 523 (2015).
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if one encounters a threatening assailant outside one’s home, one has
a duty to avoid confrontation before using deadly force. By contrast,
when one is acting in a jurisdiction that has a “stand your ground” law,
if confronted by a threatening assailant when walking down the street,
there is no duty to avoid confrontation before using deadly force.59
“Stand your ground” complicates the traditional common law
approach.60 Traditional common law notions of self-defense are
predicated on a variety of factors: 1) that the individual asserting the
defense is engaged in lawful activity; 2) that the individual is not the
aggressor in a situation; 3) that the individual holds a reasonable belief
that he or she is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from an
adversary; and 4) that the individual uses force proportional to the
threat posed.61 Generally, if individuals are unlawfully attacked outside
of the home, they are required to take steps to avoid using deadly
force.62 Traditionally, an individual may be justified in using deadly
force in self-defense only if he or she “reasonably believes that the
other is about to inflict unlawful death or serious bodily harm.”63
Like the common law, “stand your ground” statutes require
proportionality—force must be met with similar force.64 If deadly force
is used, the individual seeking justification must have had a reasonable
belief that deadly force was required to prevent the commission of a
felony, death, or serious bodily harm to him or herself or another.65
A. “Stand Your Ground” in Florida
The Florida Legislature enacted its “stand your ground” statute,
section 776.013, effective October 1, 2005, to offer a greater right of
self-defense to its citizens. At the time Zimmerman was charged,
Florida’s statute read:
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who
is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to
be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her
ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if
he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to
prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or
59

Id.
Lawson, supra note 56, at 287.
61
40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 134.
62
40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 159; L.W.B., Annotation, Homicide: Duty to Retreat When
Not on One’s Own Premises, 18 A.L.R. 1279 (1922).
63
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4(b) at 541 (4th ed. 2003).
64
40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 134.
65
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Make My Day” and
“Stand Your Ground” Statutes, 76 A.L.R. 6TH 1, 9 (2012).
60
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another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.66
The main import of this statute for cases involving deadly force is to
eradicate any duty to retreat if one reasonably believes that such force
is necessary to prevent one’s own or another’s death or great bodily
harm.67 Rather than acting in the traditional manner as a defense that
the defendant could assert to escape liability if charged,68 Florida’s
“stand your ground” statute goes much further. By design, the statute
wholly immunizes defendants from any of the negative effects of
prosecution.69 Under the Florida statute, defendants may escape tort
liability and prosecution in criminal cases.70
Previous Florida cases in which defendants asserted their rights
under the “stand your ground” law have involved circumstances far
removed from the situation in which George Zimmerman
encountered Trayvon Martin. In State v. Gallo for instance, the
defendant, Alphonse Orlando Gallo, and the victim, Patrick Barbour,
knew each other.71 They argued outside a nightclub over a debt that
Barbour allegedly owed Gallo.72 Things got heated between the two
men and an armed confrontation ensued, involving not just Gallo and
Barbour, but two other men.73 Barbour was killed, and prosecutors
charged Gallo with second degree murder.74 When Gallo argued
immunity, both trial and appeals courts agreed that he had immunity
from prosecution under Florida’s “stand your ground” law.75
The relationship between weapons and criminality has meant that
legislatures enacting “stand your ground” statutes are often blindingly
clear about the fact that they do not wish those engaged in illegal
activity to find protection in “stand your ground” laws.76 Thus, courts
have rejected the defense in situations where individuals engaged in
66

FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2005) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2)
(West 2014).
67
See State v. Smiley, 927 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
68
Id.
69
See FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2005), amended by 2014 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2014195 § 4.
70
See Smiley, 927 So. 2d at 1002.
71
76 So. 3d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
72
Id. at 408.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 409.
76
For example, both LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(C) (2014) and OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 1289.25(D) (2011) use essentially the same language as Florida’s 2005 statute,
explicitly declaring no duty to retreat if a person “is not engaged in an unlawful
activity.” See FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2005), amended by 2014 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2014195 § 4 (West).
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illegal behavior have sought immunity from prosecution. One
example from Florida, Darling v. State, involved a convicted felon who
went to a housing project to purchase marijuana.77 Though he was by
law prohibited from carrying a weapon,78 a previous experience
purchasing drugs at the same location persuaded the defendant to arm
himself.79 Though the defendant was not able to purchase drugs at this
particular time, someone on the street accosted him and a gunfight
ensued.80 Ultimately, the gunfight resulted in a bystander’s death.81
The defendant attempted to avoid criminal liability by relying on the
“stand your ground” statute to argue that he was responding to
another’s threat.82 The trial court, using reasoning later upheld on
appeal, found that because the defendant was a felon in possession of
a firearm, he could not rely on the “stand your ground” statute.83
B. How “Stand Your Ground” Laws Work on the Ground with
Defendants as a Function of Race
Anecdotal and systematic evidence suggests that prosecutors have
applied “stand your ground” laws differentially depending upon the
defendant’s race. Anecdotally, one can point to Marissa Alexander, a
thirty-two-year-old Black Floridian who was unable to rely on “stand
your ground” at trial in 2010.84 Prosecuted by Angela Corey, the same
special prosecutor assigned to the Zimmerman case,85 Alexander was
charged with aggravated assault after she discharged a warning shot
into the wall during an altercation with her abusive husband.86 No one
was injured during the altercation.87 The judge in Alexander’s case
rejected her use of Florida’s “stand your ground” statute, and after
convicting Alexander on three counts of aggravated assault, sentenced
her to twenty years in prison.88
77

Darling v. State, 81 So. 3d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 578.
79
Id. at 576.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Darling, 81 So. 3d at 578–79.
84
Billy Kenber, Marissa Alexander Case in Spotlight After Zimmerman Trial, WASH.
POST (July 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2013/07/15/
6030be5a-ed5c-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d_story.html.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. The Zimmerman trial created significant buzz about Alexander’s case,
especially since the special prosecutor assigned to the Zimmerman case also
prosecuted Alexander’s case. Following a successful appeal to Florida’s First District
78
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Even more compelling than anecdotal cases like that of Alexander
is systematic evidence, which compares how Blacks and Whites fare
when attempting to rely on “stand your ground” statutes. One study,
conducted by John Roman and P. Mitchell Downey of the Urban
Institute, examined this issue using 2005–2009 data from the FBI’s
supplementary homicide report, which includes all reported
homicides in the United States.89 The only homicides applicable in
“stand your ground” cases are justifiable homicides,90 which constitute
fewer than 2% of the overall number of homicides during this time
period.91 After separating out the justifiable homicides, the authors
tried to find situations in which the facts resembled those in the
Zimmerman/Martin case—a single shooter and single victim who were
both civilians and strangers, and the victim was killed by a handgun.92
“Stand your ground” laws have two significant impacts, according
to Roman and Downey’s study.93 The first involves whether or not a
jury or judge will find a homicide justified.94 The authors’ research
revealed that in states with “stand your ground” laws, judges or juries
found 13.6% of the homicides to be justified. In states without “stand
your ground” legislation judges or juries found only 7.2% to be
justified.95
The second impact of these types of laws, as revealed by Roman
and Downey’s study, pertained to the relationship between conviction
and the race of both the perpetrator and the victim.96 The authors
examined the kinds of cases most likely to be justified and found that
“the scenario with the highest probability of being justified is much
like the Martin case—a single, white civilian handgun shooter who is a
stranger to (and older than) the Black victim.”97 According to this

Court of Appeal, Alexander’s conviction was overturned and her case remanded. See
Alexander v. State, 121 So. 3d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). In November 2014,
Alexander accepted a plea bargain. Larry Hannan, Alexander takes deal in criminal case;
out of jail Jan. 27, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Nov. 24, 2014, 6:30 PM),
http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2014-11-24/story/alexander-takes-dealcriminal-case-out-jail-jan-27.
89
John Roman & P. Mitchell Downey, Stand Your Ground Laws and Miscarriages of
Justice, URBAN WIRE (Mar. 29, 2012), http://blog.metrotrends.org/2012/03/standground-laws-miscarriages-justice.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Roman & Downey, supra note 89.
96
Id.
97
Id.
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research, “stand your ground” laws exacerbate the already-existing
racial disparities in justifiable homicide cases:
Overall, the rate of justifiable homicides is almost six times
higher in case [sic] with attributes that match the Martin
case. Racial disparities are [also] much larger, as [W]hiteon-[B]lack homicides have justifiable findings 33 percentage
points more often than [B]lack-on-[W]hite homicides.
“Stand Your Ground” [(SYG)] laws appear to exacerbate
those differences, as cases overall are significantly more likely
to be ruled justified in SYG states than in non-SYG states . . . .98
While it is much more likely that judges or juries will find that single
White shooters of Blacks have justifiably killed his or her victims, this
did not mean, of course, that the Zimmerman verdict was a foregone
conclusion. Out of 70,000 cases, only twenty-three homicides had
similar facts to the Martin case, and of those, only nine (39%) were
ruled justifiable homicides.99
Roman and Downey argue that their research suggests that
because Florida is a “stand your ground” state, Zimmerman would be
exempted from the need to demonstrate to the jury that the shooting
was justified.100 While ultimately that did not occur due to the immense
public and political outcry,101 the defense spent a significant amount of
time offering evidence of justification predicated on the logic of “stand
your ground.”102 Moreover, “stand your ground” laws encourage the
wide-scale arming of individuals.103 It is unlikely that Zimmerman, who
told 911 dispatchers that Martin had something in his hands (candy
and tea),104 would have exited his car and pursued Martin had he not
98

JOHN K. ROMAN, RACE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE, AND STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS:
ANALYSIS OF FBI SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORT DATA 9 (2013),
http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/412873-stand-your-ground.pdf. As the author
details, in “stand your ground” states, Black defendants are less successful than White
defendants in obtaining a justifiable homicide determination as compared to Black
defendants relative to White defendants in non-“stand your ground” states.
99
Roman & Downey, supra note 89.
100
Id.
101
See Zimmerman to Argue Self-defense, Will Not Seek ‘Stand Your Ground’ Hearing, CNN
(May 1, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/30/justice/florida-zimmermandefense/.
102
See Lizette Alvarez, In Zimmerman Case, Self-defense Was Hard to Topple, N.Y. TIMES
(July 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/us/in-zimmerman-case-selfdefense-was-hard-to-topple.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
103
See STEVEN JANSEN & M. ELAINE NUGENT-BORAKOVE, EXPANSIONS TO THE CASTLE
DOCTRINE 12 (2007), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Castle%20Doctrine.pdf (noting that
a possible negative consequence of expanding the castle doctrine is “[e]scalations in
violence that may not have otherwise occurred if people were not carrying weapons
for self-defense”).
104
Botelho, supra note 27.
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been armed.105
These laws, then, not only exacerbate racial
disproportionalities in outcomes of justifiable homicides,106 but also
increase lethal violence against Blacks overall.107 Thus, one study found
that “[c]ontrolling for population, the number of homicides of Black
people that were deemed justifiable in Stand Your Ground states more
than doubled between 2005 and 2011—rising from 0.5 to 1.2 per
100,000 people—while it remained unchanged in the rest of the
country.”108
III. GRAPPLING WITH THE EVIDENCE: ISSUES OF RACE AND
GENDER
Against the backdrop of Florida’s “stand your ground law,” the
Zimmerman jury also grappled with ambiguous and complicated
evidentiary issues. No one saw the entire encounter between Martin
and Zimmerman at close range.109 The defense argued that George
Zimmerman had shot Trayvon Martin because he feared for his life.110
Key to that assertion was a 911 recording of a voice screaming for
help.111 The defense put on nine witnesses who maintained that the
voice on the recording was Zimmerman’s,112 whereas the prosecution
put on witnesses who identified the voice as Martin’s.113 From the
prosecution’s perspective, a clear size and force differential existed
between the victim and defendant; the armed Zimmerman
outweighed Martin by more than forty pounds.114 There is also the
innocence factor that the prosecution sought to make salient for the
105

Author Jeannine Bell is grateful to Tracey Meares for this point.
NAT’L URBAN LEAGUE ET AL., SHOOT FIRST: ‘STAND YOUR GROUND’ LAWS AND
THEIR EFFECT ON VIOLENT CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2013),
http://maig.us/186JLnh.
107
Id. at 4.
108
Id. at 7.
109
Yamiche Alcindor, Witnesses in Trayvon Martin Case Offer Differing Accounts, USA
TODAY (June 3, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-0603/trayvon-martin-case-witness-statements/55349480/1.
110
See Zimmerman to Argue Self-defense, Will Not Seek ‘Stand your Ground’ Hearing, supra
note 101.
111
Lizette Alvarez, Trayvon Martin’s Father Says Screams on 911 Tape Were His Son’s,
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/us/friends-testifythat-zimmerman-is-the-one-screaming-for-help-on-911-call.html?_r=0.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
See A Review of the Evidence Released in the Trayvon Martin Case, TAMPA BAY TIMES
(May 17, 2012), http://www.tampabay.com/news/a-review-of-the-evidence-releasedin-the-trayvon-martin-case/1230750; Documents in the Trayvon Martin Case, N.Y. TIMES
(May 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/05/17/us/trayvonmartin-documents.html.
106
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jurors: Martin, a teenager, was on a snack run and had no history of
violence.115
Conversely, the defense constructed a narrative of Martin as a
prototypical criminal threat,116 tying Zimmerman’s reaction to him to
a series of burglaries that occurred in the housing development over
the prior year.117 Why did the jurors ultimately accept Zimmerman’s
story (or reject the prosecution’s version)? What might have been
expected given research on how juror demographics, defendant and
victim demographics, and jury dynamics interact in criminal cases?
A. The Development of Empirical Jury Research
Systematic empirical research on jury decision-making dates back
to the 1950s with the launching of the University of Chicago Jury
Project.118 The Chicago Jury Project brought together lawyers and
social scientists to broadly study the jury as an American legal
institution.119 One focus within this pioneering endeavor was on jury
dynamics in criminal trials, with early insights drawn from field
research conducted with jurors sitting on criminal cases in both
Chicago, Illinois and Brooklyn, New York.120 The Project culminated
in a nation-wide survey of 555 judges regarding their experiences
presiding over criminal trials, which was published by lead researchers
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel in The American Jury.121 This book
reported on how and why juries and judges diverged in case
assessments and verdict preferences, which occurred in about a
quarter of the 3576 cases described by the surveyed judges in the
questionnaires.122
Kalven and Zeisel’s insights set the ball rolling on several strands
of research that continue to this day123 and that have implications for
115

Trayvon Martin, BIOGRAPHY.COM., http://www.biography.com/people/trayvonmartin-21283721 (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
116
George Zimmerman Lawyers Release Data from Trayvon Martin’s Cellphone, THE
GUARDIAN (May 23, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/23/
zimmerman-lawyers-trayvon-martin-texts.
117
Erin Donaghue, George Zimmerman Trial: Chris Serino, Lead Detective in Case of
Trayvon Martin Killing, Takes Stand Again Tuesday, CBS NEWS (July 10 2013),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-zimmerman-trial-chris-serino-lead-detectivein-case-of-trayvon-martin-killing-takes-stand-again-tuesday/.
118
Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959).
119
Id.
120
Id. at 747.
121
HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
122
Id. at 55–56.
123
See, e.g., DANIEL GIVELBER & AMY FARRELL, NOT GUILTY: ARE THE ACQUITTED
INNOCENT? (2012); Valerie P. Hans et al., The Hung Jury: The American Jury’s Insights and
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understanding the verdict in the Zimmerman case. For instance, one
significant finding was that when juries disagreed with judges, the jury
was typically more lenient on criminal defendants.124 In about 85% of
the disagreements, the jury voted to acquit where the judge deemed
the appropriate verdict to be a conviction.125 Kalven and Zeisel argued
that the tendency toward leniency, relative to the trial judges’
assessments, was not due to jurors’ comprehension problems, but
rather seemed to occur in close cases in which the juries were thought
to be “liberated” from the strength of the evidence, allowing them to
make judgments in light of other factors, including “sentimentality.”126
Thus, the “liberation hypothesis” was born, prompting a line of
research regarding conditions under which “extra-legal” factors, such
as racial or other stereotypes,127 in-group favoritism,128 empathy,129 or
other such phenomena exert influence on jury outcomes.130
Finally, the findings from the field study portion of the Project
found that jurors’ verdict preference, pre-deliberation, was the best
predictor of verdict outcome.131 This suggested that perhaps the group
deliberation process was less important in most cases than thought to
be. In light of this hypothesis, a number of scholars subsequently set
out to uncover how juries come to decisions: Is it as simple as a
“majority rules” vote that causes minority members to join the crowd,
or are there other dynamics at play?132 Moreover, do jurors make
Contemporary Understanding, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 33 (2003). See also Theodore Eisenberg
et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The
American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2005) (recent partial replication of this
classic study).
124
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 58–59.
125
Id. at 61 (converting ratio of 8:1).
126
Id. at 164–66.
127
DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 399 (1990); Jonathan R.
Sorensen & Donald H. Wallace, Capital Punishment in Missouri: Examining the Issue of
Racial Disparity, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61 (1995); Marian R. Williams & Melissa W. Burek,
Justice, Juries, and Convictions: The Relevance of Race in Jury Verdicts, 31 J. CRIME & JUST.
149 (2008).
128
Norbert L. Kerr et al., Defendant-Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments, 19 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 545 (1995).
129
See generally Bette L. Bottoms et al., Explaining Gender Differences in Jurors’ Reactions
to Child Sexual Assault Cases, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 789 (2014).
130
BALDUS ET AL., supra note 127, at 40304. For a direct test of the liberation
hypothesis using pretrial publicity influence as the dependent variable, see Dennis J.
Devine et al., Strength of Evidence, Extra Evidentiary Influence, and the Liberation Hypothesis:
Data from the Field., 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 136 (2009).
131
Broeder, supra note 118, at 747.
132
See REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 22–
23 (1983) for information on the “story model” of deliberations.
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decisions about their verdict preferences prematurely, before the
conclusion of evidence and arguments?133
Jury research along these lines began to flourish within several
years of The American Jury’s publication,134 and psychologists, in
particular, have produced a substantial proportion of this work.135
Numerous tangents of this body of research and multiple ways to map
it exist. For the purposes of this Article, this research will be broken
down in its sequential order to describe relevant research that speaks
to influences, at both the individual and group levels, on the jury’s
decision, beginning with the potential venire person through to the
final verdict in a criminal matter. As the diagram below models, there
are multiple stages and levels in the jury process which can influence
verdict outcomes above and beyond the testimony, evidence, and
arguments in a given case. Put simply, how a case is understood and
assessed will vary as a function of the individuals tasked with factfinding and the unique group dynamics of the jury unit. Therefore,
how individuals are identified for selection, who is seated and who is
excluded, and how that assemblage of individuals relates and
undertakes the fact-finding task will matter, to varying degrees, for the
outcome determination.

133

Robert MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-making, 30 JURIMETRICS J.
223 (1990).
134
Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The American Jury at Twenty-five Years, 16 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 323 (1991).
135
See DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: STATE OF THE SCIENCE (2012)
[hereinafter DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING]; Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision
Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
622 (2001) [hereinafter Devine et al., 45 Years]. For a collection of recent work by
psychologists, see 1 JURY PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESSES (Joel D.
Lieberman & Daniel A. Krauss eds., 2009).
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Figure 1: Stages and Levels of Influence of Jury Decision-making:

This Article views this as a path-dependent, cumulative effects
model, in which the earlier-stage outcomes shape later-stage processes.
In other words, each stage involves processes that themselves may be
subject to bias, extra-legal influence, and error, and those biases and
errors move on in consequential ways through the subsequent steps.136
This Article will primarily focus on individual-level juror attributes and
how they interact with defendant and victim characteristics. It will then
move on to examine group-level processes that lead to a jury verdict,
with a focus on how jury composition shapes outcomes, including
members’ demographic make-up, case characteristics and decisionmaking criteria, and jury size.
B. Demographic, Experiential, and Attitudinal Variability of Jurors
1. Juror Characteristics and Judgment
Despite the mythological legal ideal of the juror as a “blank
slate,”137 potential jurors arrive at courthouses with a diverse array of
life experiences, which emerge in part from their social and
demographic backgrounds. These life experiences influence jurors’
perceptions, knowledge bases, attitudes, and beliefs. Individual
characteristics can, in turn, condition how jurors understand and
Some psychological research has
judge case information.138
demonstrated that individual juror characteristics can matter in juror
decision-making for cases involving criminal charges, and the degree
of influence typically varies as a function of case facts.139 Personality

136

For a full discussion of such a model in the capital case context, see Mona Lynch
and Craig Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male Capital Juror: Jury Composition
and the “Empathic Divide,” 45 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 69 (2011).
137
See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 6 (1988).
138
DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135.
139
See generally id. at 103–16.
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traits like dogmatism140 and authoritarianism,141 for instance, have been
Attitudes about
shown to predict conviction-proneness.142
punishment, especially capital punishment, can also influence
judgment processes and verdict preferences.143 Because death penalty
attitudes are central to the capital jury qualification process,144 they
have been most extensively studied.145 Generally, research indicates
that support for capital punishment predicts both convictionproneness146 and premature judgments of guilt.147
2. Juror-Defendant Interactions
Juror characteristics can also interact with defendant
characteristics. For instance, a number of studies have demonstrated
a “similarity-leniency effect,”148 whereby jurors who share demographic
features with the defendant, including gender, socio-economic status,
and especially racial or ethnic identity, are acquittal-prone in weakevidence cases. Conversely, studies have also shown a “Black sheep
effect,” whereby similar jurors are guilt-prone in strong-evidence
cases.149

140

Heather M. Kleider, Leslie R. Knuycky & Sarah E. Cavrak, Deciding the Fate of
Others: The Cognitive Underpinnings of Racially Biased Juror Decision Making, 139 J. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 175 (2012) (discussing the issues of cognitive capacity of jurors, evidence
type, and racial bias in outcomes).
141
Douglass J. Narby, Brian L. Cutler & Gary Moran, A Meta-Analysis of the
Association Between Authoritarianism and Jurors’ Perceptions of Defendant Culpability, 78 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 34 (1993).
142
Carol M. Werner, Dorothy K. Kagehiro, & Michael J. Strube, Conviction Proneness
and the Authoritarian Juror: Inability to Disregard Information or Attitudinal Bias?, 67 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629, 629 (1982).
143
For a review, see Mona Lynch, The Social Psychology of Capital Cases, in JURY
PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESSES 157 (Joel D. Lieberman & Daniel A.
Krauss eds., 2012).
144
Id.
145
Id. For an example of such work, see Craig Haney, Aida Hurtado & Luis Vega,
“Modern” Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 619
(1994).
146
William C. Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The
Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 104 (1984) (explaining
that death penalty attitudes predict conviction proneness through differential
interpretation of evidence).
147
W. J. Bowers, M. Sandys & B. Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing:
Jurors’ Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1476, 1531 (1998).
148
DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 113.
149
Id.
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The other side of this coin, of course, is out-group bias, whereby
defendants with dissimilar demographics from jurors will be generally
disadvantaged.150 Experimental mock jury research on capital penaltyphase decision-making has demonstrated that White men may be
particularly prone to exercising out-group bias, in that they are
significantly more likely to sentence a Black male defendant to death
than they are to sentence an otherwise identical White male
defendant.151 Notably, in this study, racially disparate sentencing was
isolated to the White male participants as a subgroup, suggesting that
in-group/out-group biases may be particularly problematic for this
group.152 More generally, a meta-analysis of thirty-four mock jury
studies involving nearly 7400 participants indicates that “participants
were more likely to render guilt judgments for other-race defendants
than for defendants of their own race.”153 Taken together, these
findings appear to suggest that racial identification with the defendant
can be an important moderator of verdicts, particularly in equivocal
cases.
Because the vast majority of criminal defendants are men,154 there
would seem to be the potential for a gender-based out-group bias
among women jurors for most criminal cases. Moreover, while
“literally hundreds of jury studies have measured participant
gender[,] . . . [f]ormal hypotheses or even explicit expectations
regarding participant gender are actually rather rare.”155 Of the body
of research that has focused on gender differences and lay judgment
in criminal cases, most studies have used various sexual assault

150

E.g., R. Michael Bagby & Neil A. Rector, Prejudice in a Simulated Legal Context: A
Further Application of Social Identity Theory, 22 EUROPEAN J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 397, 397–406
(1992). But see Jan-Willem van Prooijen & Jerôme Lam, Retributive Justice and Social
Categorizations: The Perceived Fairness of Punishment Depends on Intergroup Status, 37
EUROPEAN J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1244, 1244–55 (2007), where in-group/out-group
relational status mediates this effect.
151
Lynch & Haney, supra note 136, at 87 (finding that White male mock jurors
sentenced the White male defendant at rates similar to women and non-Whites (60%
versus 62%), but were significantly more punitive toward the Black defendant than
their peers (84% versus 64% death sentences)).
152
Id. at 86.
153
Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic
Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 627 (2005).
154
The Bureau of Justice Statistics survey of the nation’s seventy-five largest
counties in 2009 (the most recent survey available) indicates that 83% of felony
defendants that year were men and 17% were women. BRIAN A. REAVES, FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 5,
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf.
155
DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 111.
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scenarios to test hypotheses.156 Much of that research suggests that
women are more conviction-prone157 than men, which may stem from
either out-group bias against the defendant or in-group empathy for
the victim.158
For instance, an experimental study that varied the gender of
both victim and defendant in a child sexual abuse case found that
“women jurors were generally more pro-victim in their case judgments
than were men jurors.”159 Nonetheless, the gender of victim did not
mediate women’s assessment of the case, but it did so for men, in that
they rated male victims as more responsible for the crime than female
victims.160 Moreover, female mock jurors were no more sympathetic to
the female defendant than were male jurors (both groups, but
especially the male jurors, were more lenient toward the female
defendant),161 suggesting that perhaps females are less prone to ingroup biases than males.162
156

For child sexual assault studies, see Bette L. Bottoms et al., A Review of Factors
Affecting Jurors’ Decisions in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS
MEMORY 1 (2007) [hereinafter Bottoms, Review]; Bette L. Bottoms, Suzanne L. Davis
& Michelle A. Epstein, Effects of Victim and Defendant Race on Jurors’ Decisions in Child
Sexual Abuse Cases, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (2004); Bette L. Bottoms & Gail S.
Goodman, Perceptions of Children’s Credibility in Sexual Assault Cases, 24 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 702 (1994). For a review of studies on rape, see Amy Grubb & Julie Harrower,
Attribution of Blame in Cases of Rape: An Analysis of Participant Gender, Type of Rape and
Perceived Similarity to the Victim, 13 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 396 (2008).
157
In the case of rape, see, for example, Nancy Brekke & Eugene Borgida, Expert
Psychological Testimony in Rape Trials: A Social Cognitive Analysis, 55 J. PERSONALITY
PSYCHOL. 372, 372, 384 (1988); Kathleen McNamara, Frank Vattano & Wayne Viney,
Verdict, Sentencing, and Certainty as a Function of Sex of Juror and Amount of Evidence in a
Simulated Rape Trial, 72 PSYCHOL. REP. 575 (1993). In the case of child sexual abuse,
see Natalie J. Gabora, Nicholas P. Spanos & Amanda Joab, The Effects of Complainant
Age and Expert Psychological Testimony in a Simulated Child Sexual Abuse Trial, 17 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 103 (1993); Jodi A. Quas et al., Effects of Victim, Defendant, and Juror Gender
on Decisions in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1993 (2002).
Schutte and Hosch conducted a meta-analysis of experimental studies deploying both
child sexual abuse and rape case scenarios and found that women were more
conviction-prone than men across all the included studies. James W. Schutte &
Harmon M. Hosch, Gender Differences in Sexual Assault Verdicts: A Meta-Analysis, 12 J. SOC.
BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 759 (1997). Women have also been found more likely to
support detention when asked to evaluate “sexually violent predators” involving an
adult victim. See Laura S. Guy & John F. Edens, Juror Decision-making in a Mock Sexually
Violent Predator Trial: Gender Differences in the Impact of Divergent Types of Expert Testimony,
21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 (2003).
158
Sheila R. Deitz et al., Measurement of Empathy Toward Rape Victims and Rapists, 43
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 37 (1982) (reporting higher rates of empathy for rape
victims among women in comparison to men).
159
Quas et al., supra note 157, at 2009.
160
Id. at 2005.
161
Id.
162
Devine’s review of the literature on juror gender concurs with this. See DEVINE,
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Outside of the sexual assault/abuse context, which potentially
triggers greater gender differences in judgment due to the nature of
the cases, only a small handful of studies systematically examine the
effect of juror gender on judgment.163 Consistent with the sex-related
case paradigms, experimental research finds that women are also more
conviction-prone than men in elder abuse cases, for male and female
defendants, and for male and female victims.164 Also, several death
penalty mock jury studies report on juror gender in sentence verdict
preferences. These studies find that men are more likely than women
to “qualify” as capital jurors,165 and men are more likely to favor a death
sentence than women when making a penalty judgment even among
those death qualified.166
A body of research also suggests that laypersons’ stereotypes about
crime interact with a defendant’s race in a biasing manner. For
instance, in mock jury studies, minority defendants charged with
stereotypical “street crimes” were treated more harshly than White
defendants, whereas White defendants were treated more harshly
when accused of “white collar” crimes.167 Stereotyped judgments
appear to derive from both racial and class cues about the defendant.
In another example, White mock jurors demonstrate bias against a
Latino defendant charged with auto theft, relative to an otherwise
identical White defendant, when the defendant is also characterized as
being of a low socio-economic status, but not when he is portrayed as
being of a higher socio-economic status.168 Moreover, the Latino
defendant of a low socio-economic status was treated more harshly in
JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 112.
163
Id.
164
Jonathan M. Golding et al., The Effect of Gender in the Perception of Elder Physical
Abuse in Court, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 605 (2005).
165
Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing,
Comprehension, and Discrimination, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 481 (2009) [hereinafter
Lynch & Haney, Capital Jury]; Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and
Instructional Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 337 (2000) [hereinafter Lynch & Haney, Discrimination]; Monica K.
Miller & R. David Hayward, Religious Characteristics and the Death Penalty, 32 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 113 (2008).
166
Lynch & Haney, Capital Jury, supra note 165, at 486; Lynch & Haney,
Discrimination, supra note 165, at 346.
167
Randall A. Gordon, et al., Perceptions of Blue-Collar and White-Collar Crime: The
Effect of Defendant Race on Simulated Juror Decisions, 128 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 191 (1988); see
also Christopher S. Jones & Martin F. Kaplan, The Effects of Racially Stereotypical Crimes
on Juror Decision-making and Information-processing Strategies, 25 BASIC & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1 (2003).
168
C. Willis Esqueda, R.K.E. Espinoza & S. Culhane, The Effects of Ethnicity, SES, and
Crime Status on Juror Decision Making: A Cross-Cultural Examination of European American
and Mexican American Mock Jurors, 30 HISPANIC J. BEHAV. SCI. 181 (2008).
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this study than all others, even for the “white collar” crime of
embezzlement.169 On the other hand, no in-group favoritism for the
Latino defendant was demonstrated: Latino jurors treated White and
Latino defendants similarly no matter the crime or the perceived socioeconomic status of the defendant.170 Contributing to the overall bias
against non-White defendants is the widely-held presumption that,
absent any countering information, laypersons “see” minority
defendants as lower class and view White defendants as belonging to a
higher socio-economic status.171
Psychological research has also pinpointed several conditions in
which out-group bias of this sort is either muted or even reversed. For
example, Samuel Sommers and his colleagues have found that when
race is made salient by making it relevant to the fact pattern in a mock
criminal case, the bias of White jurors against Black defendants is
attenuated, whereas without such “notice” of race’s relevancy, Whites
demonstrate negative racial bias.172 Moreover, several mock juror
studies examining White participants’ judgments of “hate crime” cases
have found that they produce higher rates of guilt and more punitive
recommendations for sentencing against White defendants than Black
defendants.173 In this case, race is not only salient, but racial animus is
a central element to the crime, which undoubtedly contributes to the
guilt ratings as well as the sentence recommendations.

169

Id.
Id.
171
Jeffrey E. Pfeifer & Daniel J. Bernstein, Expressions of Modern Racism in Judgments
of Others: The Role of Task and Target Specificity on Attributions of Guilt, 31 SOC. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY 749, 755 (2003) (finding “subjects were significantly more likely to
perceive the defendant as black when he was portrayed as a low, as opposed to high,
social status individual and more likely to perceive him as white when the defendant
was portrayed as a high social status individual”).
172
Ellen S. Cohn, Donald Bucolo, Misha Pride & Samuel R. Sommers, Reducing
White Juror Bias: The Role of Race Salience and Racial Attitudes, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1953, 196465 (2009); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the
Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367, 1376 (2000); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White
Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom,
7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 220 (2001) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, White
Juror Bias]; see generally Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in
Juror Decision-making: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 599 (2009) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, Race Salience] (generally
summarizing research on the race salience effect).
173
Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, Juror Decision Making in Hate Crime Cases, 14 CRIM. JUST.
POL’Y REV. 193 (2003); Amy Marcus-Newhall, Laura Palucki Blake & Julia Baumann,
Perceptions of Hate Crime Perpetrators and Victims as Influenced by Race, Political Orientation,
and Peer Group, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 108 (2002).
170
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3. Juror-Victim Interactions
With regard to victim characteristics and jury decision-making,
the most robust research comes from the death-sentencing arena,
wherein a relatively strong and consistent devaluation of minority
victims has been observed in the United States context.174 Studies that
use regression analytic techniques to examine actual sentence
outcomes in death penalty jurisdictions across the nation have found
that White victims are significantly more likely to prompt death
sentences than Black victims after controlling for legally relevant
factors.175 Findings from the capital context also indicate an
interaction effect, in which mock jurors will most likely sentence Black
defendants convicted of killing White victims to death.176 Finally,
recent work re-examining these studies177 to consider both race and
gender of victims, has found that cases involving Black male victims
were the least likely to result in a death sentence.178
In the non-capital homicide context, studies that use actual case
outcome data from varied U.S. jurisdictions suggest that juries are

174

See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, EQUAL
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990) [hereinafter
BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE]; David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death
Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview with Recent Findings from
Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1997) [hereinafter Baldus et al., Racial
Discrimination]; John J. Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty
System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 11 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 696 (2014); Radha Iyengar, Who’s the Fairest in the Land?
Analysis of Judge and Jury Death Penalty Decisions, 54 J.L. & ECON. 693 (2011); Sheri Lynn
Johnson et al., The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1925
(2011). Contradicting the longstanding, robust findings of these differences is Wesley
G. Jennings et al., A Critical Examination of the “White Victim Effect” and Death Penalty
Decision-Making from a Propensity Score Matching Approach: The North Carolina Experience,
42 J. CRIM. JUST. 384 (2014).
175
See supra note 174 and accompanying text. Note especially BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL
JUSTICE, supra note 174, and Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination supra note 174. See also
U.S. GOV’T ACCT. OFF., GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES
PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (Feb. 1990), http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/
212180.pdf; Raymond Paternoster & Robert Brame, Reassessing Race Disparities in
Maryland Capital Cases, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 971 (2008).
176
See supra note 174 and accompanying text; see also Lynch & Haney,
Discrimination, supra note 165.
177
Marian R. Williams, Stephen Demuth & Jefferson E. Holcomb, Understanding
the Influence of Victim Gender in Death Penalty Cases: The Importance of Victim Race, SexRelated Victimization, and Jury Decision Making, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 868 (2007).
178
Id. at 865.
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more lenient toward defendants who have killed non-Whites,179 men,180
and those whose victims “physically provoked” the defendant.181 Other
research using experimental methodology has found that Black and
Latino child sexual assault victims are viewed by mock jurors as more
responsible for their own abuse than White victims; however, that did
not translate into less culpability for the defendant.182 Conversely,
mock juror research using “hate crime” case facts indicates that Black
victims prompt stronger assessments of guilt and more severe
punishment recommendations relative to cases involving White
victims.183 This finding lends support to Sommers and Ellsworth’s
thesis that race “salience” counteracts derogation of minorities in the
criminal justice system.184
In regard to victim-juror interactions, as noted above, prior mock
jury research indicates that women are more conviction-prone in
sexual violence cases involving female and child victims.185 In
experimental research using an acquaintance rape case scenario,
researchers found that men and women differ in their assessments of
the case, with women expressing more support for victims.186 Both
male and female mock jurors, however, devalue Black female victims
relative to White female victims.187 Australian researchers have
examined the interactions of juror gender with the male defendant’s
and female victim’s race, respectively, among a White Australian
participant group who rendered verdict preferences and sentence
recommendations after reading about a non-capital murder case.188
Findings indicated that, “female mock jurors were particularly severe
toward the Black defendant in comparison to the White defendant and
were more punitive toward the Black defendant than their male
179

Eric P. Baumer, Steven F. Messner & Richard B. Felson, The Role of Victim
Characteristics in the Disposition of Murder Cases, 17 JUST. Q. 281, 299 (2000); Theodore
R. Curry, The Conditional Effects of Victim and Offender Ethnicity and Victim Gender on
Sentences for Non-capital Cases, 12 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 438, 449–52 (2010).
180
Curry, supra note 179.
181
Id.; Baumer, et al., supra note 179, at 290.
182
Bottoms, Davis & Epstein, supra note 156, at 2122.
183
Marcus-Newhall et al., supra note 173, at 130.
184
Sommers & Ellsworth, Race Salience, supra note 172, at 606.
185
Bottoms, Review, supra note 156; see also Schutt & Hosch, supra note 157.
186
Linda A. Foley et al., Date Rape: Effects of Race of Assailant and Victim and Gender
of Subjects on Perceptions, 21 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 6, 12 (1995).
187
See id. at 6; see also Roxanne A. Donovan, To Blame or Not to Blame Influences of
Target Race and Observer Sex on Rape Blame Attribution, 22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 722
(2007) (demonstrating more victim blame of Black rape victims by White male study
participants, but not White female study participants).
188
Robert Forster Lee et al., The Effects of Defendant Race, Victim Race, and Juror
Gender on Evidence Processing in a Murder Trial, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 179 (2006).
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counterparts.”189 Across both male and female participants, the
“defendant was given a more punitive sentence for the Black victim as
compared to the White victim,”190 which directly contrasts the
American studies discussed supra.191
4. Self-defense Cases and Juror Judgment
Finally, in regard to case facts relevant to the Zimmerman trial,
some empirical research exists discussing how laypersons consider
claims of self-defense; however, most of the research is specific to
Battered Woman’s Syndrome and the effect of expert testimony on
judgments of guilt.192 Dan Kahan and Donald Braman, however,
conducted a study that examined lay judgments in two very divergent
cases of self-defense: a battered woman scenario involving a woman
who shot and killed her abusive husband while he slept; and a scenario
involving a White forty-two-year-old male commuter who fatally shot a
Black seventeen-year-old young man who had asked the defendant for
money on a subway platform, which the defendant interpreted as
threatening based on his previous victimizing experiences.193 In this
study, the researchers focused on how political beliefs, cultural
worldviews, and other such cognitions shaped assessments of the
cases.194 Kahan and Braman’s findings also speak to demographic
differences in how these two different uses of the self-defense
justification are interpreted.195
A nationally representative sample of 1600 American adults
participated online in Kahan and Braman’s study and were assigned to
one of the two self-defense conditions.196 In both scenarios, the
“danger” posed by the victim was made ambiguous, as were the
defendants’ ability to flee or retreat without using violence.197 The
findings reveal significant differences in predictors of acquittal as a
function of case type. Overall, findings of guilt were much lower (33%
versus 47%) for the White commuter scenario compared to the

189

Id. at 192–93.
Id. at 189.
191
Baumer et al., supra note 179; Curry, supra note 179.
192
See DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 134–36 for a discussion of
this work.
193
Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-defensive Cognition of Self-defense, 45
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 64–65 (2008).
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 27.
197
Id. at 28–34.
190
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battered woman scenario.198 Whites and political conservatives were
significantly more likely to acquit in the White commuter case, with
only 29% of Whites finding the defendant guilty compared to 56% of
Black participants finding him guilty.199 The researchers modeled the
decision-making process and found that being White, female,
politically conservative, less educated, and ascribing to hierarchical
and individualist worldviews all predicted pro-defendant
interpretation of the evidence in the White commuter scenario case
which then led to a preference for acquittal.200 Notably, political
conservatism and hierarchical worldviews had the opposite effect in
the battered woman scenario.201 Thus, beliefs (likely often shaped by
demographics) become an interpretive tool for making sense of
ambiguous facts in such cases.
This study is the most relevant systematic empirical examination
of laypersons’ interpretation of case facts with some resonance to the
Zimmerman case. Indeed, above and beyond political and worldview
perspectives, White female jurors were especially prone to acquittal in
the White commuter scenario.202 Given that five of the six Zimmerman
jurors were White women,203 this suggests that a finding of guilt with
this particular group would be harder to achieve than with a more
diverse group. This study also clearly shows that the particulars of the
kind of self-defense case significantly interact with juror
characteristics.204 The acquitting juror in the White commuter
scenario looks more like a convicting juror in other criminal matters,
both demographically and attitudinally.
C. From Jurors to Juries
The vast majority of experimental trial simulation research has
focused on individual responses to criminal cases rather than group
decision-making processes, which limits the findings’ applicability to
the “real world” conditions in which juries deliberate to a verdict.205
198

Id.
Kahan & Braman, supra note 193, at 42. Political conservatives were also less
likely to find him guilty (23%) than were liberals (43%). Id.
200
Id. at 45–46.
201
Id. at 52–53.
202
Id.
203
Buckley, supra note 40. The sixth juror was an Hispanic woman who, postverdict, revealed that she supported conviction on second degree murder, but was
bullied into going along with acquittal.
204
Kahan & Braman, supra note 193, at 54.
205
This “external validity” critique is just one of several, including the pervasive use
of college students as participants and the unrealistic stimulus materials (often written
199
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While a relatively large and consistent body of research indicates that
majority pre-deliberation preferences do predict final verdicts,206 a
number of features of the group process (both in terms of composition
and deliberative process) are important to the resolution of cases.207 In
short, the group outcome is not always the sum of its individuals’
preferences. In this section, this Article will first review the research
on jury composition effects, including the demographic make-up of
the group and the specific issue of the jury size, and then will discuss
research relevant to the jury deliberation and decision-making process.
1. The Construction of Juries and Challenges to Diversity
Many scholars have revealed that systematic demographic bias is
built into our system of identifying potential jurors for service and then
selecting them to serve.208 Hiroshi Fukurai and Richard Krooth suggest
that “each and every stage of jury selection excludes a disproportionate
number of racial and ethnic minorities from effectively serving as
jurors.”209 This is partially driven by factors such as residential stability
(which correlates with economic stability, ethnicity, and age) since a
primary mode of identifying eligible jurors is through the voting
rolls.210 The blanket exclusions that many districts impose, based on
citizenship status,211 language skills,212 and felony record,213 also serve to
homogenize jury pools. Once called to service, the jury selection
process further biases the composition of seated juries, particularly in
capital cases.214
summaries or abbreviated transcripts) used to simulate the trial. See Shari Seidman
Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561
(1997) for an early critique and DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 23
for a more recent one.
206
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121; HASTIE ET AL., supra note 132.
207
Diamond, supra note 205, at 56466. See Lynch & Haney, supra note 136, at 95,
for a discussion of this in a capital penalty context.
208
See, e.g., HIROSHI FUKURAI, EDGAR W. BUTLER & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE AND THE
JURY (1993); HIROSHI FUKURAI & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE IN THE JURY BOX: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION IN JURY SELECTION (2003); Ronald Randall, James A. Woods & Robert G.
Martin, Racial Representativeness Of Juries: An Analysis of Source List and Administrative
Effects on The Jury Pool, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 71 (2008); Mary R. Rose, Access to Juries: Some
Puzzles Regarding Race and Jury Participation, 12 SOC. CRIME L. & DEVIANCE 119 (2009).
209
FUKURAI & KROOTH, supra note 208, at 2; see also Randall, supra note, at 81.
210
Rose, supra note 208, at 124.
211
Id. at 126.
212
Id.
213
James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased: Is There Empirical Support
for Excluding Convicted Felons from Jury Service?, 36 LAW & POL’Y 1 (2014); Darren
Wheelock, A Jury of One’s “Peers”: The Racial Impact of Felon Jury Exclusion in Georgia, 32
JUST. SYS. J. 335 (2011).
214
In general, the process by which potential jurors are excused in criminal cases
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The use of peremptory challenges contributes to the selection
bias during voir dire, particularly when used by prosecutors.215 Samuel
Sommers and Michael Norton conducted experiments to test whether
peremptory use was race-based and to document how the apparent
race-based use was justified in race-neutral terms. The researchers
found that across three different samples of participants, individuals
who role-played as prosecutors in a Black defendant criminal case were
significantly more likely to exclude potential Black jurors compared to
otherwise identical potential White jurors.216 Participants in each study
derived wholly race-neutral justifications for their exclusions in 92–
94% of the cases.217 While such biased exclusion is especially likely, and
especially problematic, in cases involving non-White defendants, it
pervades as a practice no matter the race of the defendant given the
presumption that Black jurors are acquittal-prone.218
In the death penalty context, prosecutors appeared to view Black
venire members as less likely to sentence to death and, as a result,
prosecutors disproportionately struck these members during voir
disproportionately removes people of color, young people, and women. See Shamena
Anwar, Patrick J. Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, The Role of Age in Jury Selection and Trial
Outcomes (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), Working Paper No. 146,
2013), on the issue of age biasing. In capital cases the requisite death qualification
procedure exacerbates this bias. See Haney, Hurtado & Vega, supra note 145, at
62930; Alicia Summers, R. David Hayward & Monica K. Miller, Death Qualification as
Systematic Exclusion of Jurors with Certain Religious and Other Characteristics, 40 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 3218, 322829 (2010).
215
In non-capital and capital cases alike, peremptory challenges can and are used
to remove non-Whites, usually by prosecutors. See Samuel R. Sommers, & Michael I.
Norton, Race and Jury Selection: Psychological Perspectives on the Peremptory Challenge Debate,
63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 527 (2008) [hereinafter Sommers & Norton, Race and Jury
Selection]. For gender-based exclusions, see Michael I. Norton, Samuel R. Sommers &
Sara Brauner, Bias in Jury Selection: Justifying Prohibited Peremptory Challenges, 20 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 467 (2007). For an examination in the capital context, see David C.
Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001) [hereinafter Baldus et al., The Use of
Peremptory Challenges]; Catherin M. Grosso, Barbara O’Brien & George G. Woodworth,
A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson
North Carolina Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531 (2012); Melynda J. Price, Performing
Discretion or Performing Discrimination: Race, Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital
Jury Selection, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57 (2009).
216
The participant groups were, respectively, college students, law students, and
lawyers. Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure,
31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (2007).
217
See id. at 267 (“Despite the fact that race clearly played a role in peremptory
judgments, only 7% of college students, 6% of law students, and 8% of attorneys cited
race as influential.”).
218
Billy M. Turner et al., Race and Peremptory Challenges During Voir Dire: Do
Prosecution and Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 61 (1986).
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dire.219 For instance, David Baldus and his colleagues documented the
peremptory strike practices in 317 Philadelphia capital cases over a
sixteen-year-period, finding that prosecutors were especially likely to
excuse young Black men from serving, and they primary excluded
Black potential jurors of all ages and both genders.220
In cases like Zimmerman’s, Black venire members would likely be
viewed as liabilities to the defense rather than to the prosecution;
indeed, the defense used two of their three exercised strikes against
Black potential jurors, while six of the seven strikes that the
prosecution attempted to exercise were of White women.221 The
defense also challenged the prosecution’s sequential strike of four
White women on Batson grounds; the judge overturned two of those
strikes.222
2. Biasing Effects of Jury Homogeneity
Given what we know about the similarity-leniency bias and the
operation of subtle forms of White racism against minorities in
judgment settings,223 the demographic skewing of criminal juries can
lead to disparities in verdict outcomes above and beyond the individual
juror-level effects described previously. Indeed, a growing body of
research indicates that jury group diversity improves the quality of
deliberation and decision-making through the very process of bringing
together persons with different backgrounds, life experiences, and
perspectives.224

219

Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges, supra note 215, at 124; Grosso et
al., supra note 215, at 1548.
220
Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges, supra note 215, at 121–22.
221
Michael Smerconish, Did Gender, Not Race, Decide Zimmerman Verdict?, SUN
SENTINEL (Aug. 3, 2013), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-08-03/news/fl-mscolzimmerman-oped0803-20130803_1_not-guilty-verdict-george-zimmerman-juryconsultant.
222
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the U. S. Supreme Court ruled that
the defendant’s equal protection rights were violated when the prosecutor used
peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the basis of race. Jury Selected
in George Zimmerman Murder Trial, CLICK ORLANDO (June 20, 2013),
http://www.clickorlando.com/news/jury-seated-in-george-zimmerman-murdertrial/20648712.
223
For review of similarity-leniency, see Devine et al., 45 Years, supra note 135. For
White racism in judgment settings, see Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra
note 172.
224
Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL &
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 171 (2007). For capital context, see Lynch and Haney,
supra note 136.
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Sommers experimentally examined the decision-making
processes of twenty-nine six-person mock juries that considered a
criminal case involving a Black defendant.225 Half of the mock jury
groups were “diverse,” comprised of two Blacks and four Whites, and
the other half were all-White.226 Sommers found that the diverse
groups deliberated longer, discussed more of the case facts, and were
less likely to assert inaccurate facts or information in comparison to
the all-White groups.227 These findings indicated that jurors in diverse
groups engaged in more systematic information processing and more
careful consideration of relevant case facts, leading Sommers to
conclude that in “every deliberation measure examined in the present
research, heterogeneous groups outperformed homogeneous
groups.”228
Research has portrayed White-dominated juries as more
conviction-prone and punitive against non-White defendants than
more diverse juries.229 For instance, Marian Williams and Melissa
Burek examined felony trial outcomes from four large jurisdictions in
the United States and found that “juries with a higher percentage of
whites serving on them were more likely to convict black
defendants,”230 after controlling for legally relevant case factors.
Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer, and Randi Hjalmarsson examined
the impact of jury racial composition on 731 non-capital criminal trial
outcomes in Sarasota County and Lake County, Florida between 2000
and 2010, uncovering a significant impact of jury pool diversity on case
outcomes.231 Specifically, “in cases with no blacks in the jury pool, black
defendants are convicted at an 81% rate and white defendants at a 66%
rate. When the jury pool includes at least one black potential juror,
conviction rates are almost identical: 71% for black defendants and

225

Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 597, 60203 (2006).
226
Id. at 601.
227
Id. at 604–06.
228
Id. at 608.
229
Williams & Burek, supra note 127. For out-group punitiveness against Latino
defendants by White-dominated juries, see Delores A. Perez et al., Ethnicity of Defendants
and Jurors as Influences on Jury Decisions, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1249 (1993). But
see, Howard C. Daudistel et al., Effects of Defendant Ethnicity on Juries’ Dispositions of Felony
Cases, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 317 (1999) for a finding of significant out-group bias
against White defendants among Latino-dominated juries in Texas.
230
Daudistel et al., supra note 229; Williams & Burek, supra note 127, at 164.
231
Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, The Impact of Jury Race in
Criminal Trials, 127 Q. J. ECON. 1017 (2012).
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73% for white defendants.”232 The finding holds for jury composition
itself, in that juries with at least one Black juror seated led to almost
identical conviction rates, regardless of defendant race.233
In the death penalty context, William Bowers and his colleagues
have demonstrated a “white male dominance” effect, whereby capital
juries with five or more White men are dramatically more likely to
sentence to death Black defendants who kill White victims in
comparison to similar cases without such a concentration of White
men as jurors.234 Conversely, Bowers and his colleagues also identified
a “black male presence’’ effect, whereby having at least one Black man
on the jury significantly reduced the likelihood of a death sentence in
Black defendant-White victim cases.235
Experimental research also observed the “white male dominance”
effect on capital sentencing where small group juries comprised of
33% or more White men favored death in 86% of the Black defendant
cases, but only in 63% of the otherwise identical White defendant
cases.236 In contrast, the groups not dominated by White men did not
differentiate their sentence determination by race of defendant.237
Very little research exists on how juries as groups differentially
deliberate, in either capital or non-capital settings, as a function of
their own composition in concert with victim characteristics. Outside
of the Bowers et al. research on capital juries described above, research
on victim effects has generally not examined interactions between
victim demographics and jury composition factors.
3. Group Decision-Making Processes
As noted earlier, the Chicago Jury Project findings indicated a
“net jury leniency”238 in criminal verdicts when compared to judges’
assessments of cases. This finding stimulated two bodies of research,
the first of which examined how jurors and juries rely upon “extralegal” factors, including sentiment or prejudice, in their judgments
232

Id. at 1019.
Id.
234
William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black
and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 192–94 (2001); William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys & Thomas W.
Brewer, Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots of Racial Bias in Capital
Sentencing When the Defendant is Black and the Victim is White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497,
1501 (2004).
235
Bowers, Sandys & Brewer, supra note 234, at 1501.
236
Lynch & Haney, supra note 136, at 78, 84–85.
237
See id. at 84–85.
238
Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury
Deliberation: Jurors’ Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 21 (1988).
233
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when liberated from the evidence due to its ambiguous or equivocal
nature, as detailed above.239 The finding that juries will more likely
acquit than judges in weaker evidence cases has since been replicated,
with recent researchers hypothesizing that “judges have a lower
conviction threshold than juries.”240 The second body of research
asked whether the group deliberation process itself produces a
leniency bias.241 The original Chicago Jury Project analyses did not
support this hypothesis, finding instead that individual jurors’ predeliberation assessments would generally predict verdict outcomes in
a relatively straightforward manner, which suggested that the group
decision-making process had little real effect on final verdicts.242
Subsequent research has challenged that supposition,
demonstrating that an asymmetric majority-preference tipping point
seems to operate in criminal case scenarios.243 Thus, a meta-analysis of
both experimental and field research jury studies indicates that if twothirds of the jury members have a preference for an acquittal predeliberation, that will be the end verdict about 94% of the time,
whereas the same majority favoring conviction pre-deliberation leads
to just two-thirds, about 67%, of those final verdicts being
convictions.244 Moreover, in cases with even splits in pre-deliberation
verdict preferences, jury units are about four times as likely to acquit
as they are to convict.245 The “leniency asymmetry effect” is not a
general tendency towards acquittal; rather it is such that “a given
faction favoring acquittal will tend to have a greater chance of
prevailing than would an equivalently sized faction favoring
conviction.”246 Robert Kerr and Norbert MacCoun suggest that this
239

Id.
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial
Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 172
(2005).
241
MacCoun & Kerr, supra note 238, at 21.
242
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 121, at 288 (reporting further that in cases where
there was an even split on the first ballot, half of the final verdicts were acquittals and
half were convictions); Broeder, supra note 118, at 747 (reporting that analysis of the
interviews with 1500 jurors from 213 cases indicated that juries almost universally took
a first ballot “immediately” once retiring to deliberate, and “the majority on the first
ballot almost always won. The majority won in approximately ninety percent of such
cases”).
243
See, e.g., MacCoun & Kerr, supra note 238, at 22.
244
Id. at 30 (reporting on a meta-analysis of eleven studies that indicated a robust
leniency “asymmetry effect”).
245
Id.
246
Norbert L. Kerr & Robert J. MacCoun, Is the Leniency Asymmetry Really Dead?
Misinterpreting Asymmetry Effects in Criminal Jury Deliberation, 15 GROUP PROCESSES &
INTERGROUP REL. 585, 586 (2012). In this article, the authors reanalyze data reported
240
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bias likely derives from the specific burden of proof in criminal cases,
the “reasonable doubt” standard, since the effect disappears under a
“preponderance of evidence” standard.247 The bias will also most likely
be present when the evidence is equivocal as to guilt, in that
uncertainty pushes the group decision toward acquittal.248
Research suggests that deliberation styles can influence outcomes.
Scholars have delineated two primary types of deliberations: verdictdriven, where the jury polls its members frequently and frames
discussion around determining the appropriate verdict outcome;249
and evidence-driven, whereby juries work to narratively construct an
understanding of what happened without voicing verdict preferences,
then select the verdict that best fits the constructed narrative.250 Recent
work by Nicole Waters and Valerie Hans indicates that deliberation
styles impact whether and how individual jurors conform to, or dissent
from, the majority.251 Using a data set of interviews with nearly 3500
previous jurors from criminal trials in four different urban locations,
Waters and Hans first found that about 10% of the sample disagreed
with the majority preference at the end of deliberations although over
three-quarters of those “dissenters” went along with the majority
preference to achieve a unanimous verdict (characterized as
“conformers”).252 The remaining 23% were “holdouts” who caused the
jury to hang.253 Collectively, “[o]ver half the juries (54 percent)
included at least one juror whose one-person jury verdict diverged
from the final vote of the jury.”254 The likelihood of having either kind
of dissenter was strongly associated with deliberation style, in that those
juries that had early votes and secret ballots especially seemed to

since the publication of the 1988 “Asymmetric Influence” that called into question the
leniency asymmetry for actual juries, and found that while the effect was stronger for
“mock juries” it was also present for actual juries.
247
MacCoun & Kerr, supra note 238, at 27–30; see also Lynch & Haney, Capital Jury,
supra note 165 (demonstrating in the California capital penalty-phase context, which
has a preponderance standard, there appears to be a punitive asymmetry effect).
248
Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 246, at 598–99.
249
See Valerie P. Hans, Deliberation and Dissent: 12 Angry Men Versus the Empirical
Reality of Juries, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579, 585 (2007).
250
See generally HASTIE ET AL., supra note 132. As Devine points out, deliberations
are often a combination of the two styles. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note
135, at 157.
251
Nicole L. Waters & Valerie P. Hans, A Jury of One: Opinion Formation, Conformity,
and Dissent on Juries, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 513 (2009).
252
Id. at 525 (converting into percentages from last line of Table 2).
253
Id. at 527 (converting into percentages portion of total “dissenters,” N=351 that
were “holdouts,” N=82).
254
Id. at 523.
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generate dissenters.255
Additionally, those jurors especially likely to be conforming
dissenters—going along with the verdict without agreeing with it—
were those who favored convictions. Only 12.5% of convictionfavoring dissenters held out, whereas 35% of acquittal-favoring
dissenters held out.256 Dissenters in general felt less likely to influence
during the deliberations and saw their peers as less open-minded.257
Finally, experimental research has found that some jurors are
more likely to be given authority than others within deliberations.
Whites, males, and more highly educated jurors are disproportionately
likely to become forepersons.258 Forepersons, in turn, are highly
influential in shaping deliberations259 and outcomes.260 Even among
the rest of the jurors, research suggests that demographic
characteristics predict a member’s influence on others’ opinions. Men
and those of higher socio-economic status are both perceived to be
more influential to others and actually do participate more in
deliberations.261 Recent evidence shows that some jurors may be
negative influences, driving others away from their positions.262 Jessica
Salerno, for instance, manipulated the gender of an angry holdout in
a simulated deliberation and found that when female holdouts
expressed anger in deliberations, they produced a boomerang effect,
causing study participants (both male and female) to become even
more confident in their own divergent viewpoints.263 Conversely, angry
male holdouts eroded participants’ confidence in their own verdict
preferences and pulled them toward the holdout.264

255

Id. at 526.
Id. at 525.
257
Waters & Hans, supra note 251, at 528.
258
DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 154–55.
259
Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict
Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 226 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513 (1992); Erin
York & Benjamin Cornwell, Status on Trial: Social Characteristics and Influence in the Jury
Room, 85 SOC. FORCES 455 (2006).
260
Dennis J. Devine et al., Deliberation Quality: A Preliminary Examination in Criminal
Juries, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 273 (2007).
261
DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 166–67 (reviewing several
studies that report such findings).
262
Jessica M. Salerno, One Angry Woman: Emotion Expression and Minority
Influence in a Jury Deliberation Context (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Illinois at Chicago) (on file with the University of Illinois at Chicago,
available at https://indigo.uic.edu/bitstream/handle/10027/9602/
Salerno_Jessica.pdf?sequence=1).
263
Id.
264
Id. at 52–54.
256
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4. Six- vs. Twelve-Person Juries
Jury size remains the final relevant consideration of the jury
research. In 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld as constitutional
Florida’s practice of using six-person juries in felony criminal trials in
the case of Williams v. Florida.265 The Court referred to the difference
between six-person and twelve-person juries as likely “negligible” in
terms of its composition and function,266 a view vehemently rejected by
the leading jury scholars at the time.267 In the wake of this decision, for
instance, Hans Zeisel portended a significant negative effect on the
jury as a legal institution.268 Zeisel focused on two concerns: the impact
on diversity of the jury as a body, and the impact on stability in
outcomes across groups.269 On the first concern, he estimated that for
any minority group that comprises 10% of the population,
approximately 72% of twelve-person juries would include at least one
member of that group.270 That estimate drops to 47% of all six-person
juries, thereby excluding that minority group completely from more
than half of all juries.271 On the second concern, using probability
estimates, Zeisel suggested that the decrease in jury size would increase
the unpredictability of jury verdicts by approximately 41%, based on
the increased variability in diversity between juries.272 Since Zeisel
made these predictions, empirical research has largely borne him
out.273
In 1997, Michael Saks and Mollie Marti conducted a meta-analysis
of eighteen studies that looked at the effect of group size on a number
of variables, including diversity of representation, length and quality
of deliberations, and variability in outcomes.274 The researchers found
that smaller juries were less diverse, deliberated for shorter periods of
time, and, in several of the studies, jurors discussed fewer relevant case

265

399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Id. at 102.
267
DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING, supra note 135, at 42.
268
Hans Zeisel, Six Man Juries, Majority Verdicts: What Difference Do They Make?
3 (1973) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Chicago Law School
Occasional Papers, available at http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1023&context=occasional_papers).
269
Id. at 4.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
See, for example, Michael J. Saks & Mollie Weighner Marti, A Meta-Analysis of
the Effects of Jury Size, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451 (1997), for a meta-analysis of studies
that looked at jury size as an independent variable.
274
Id.
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facts and had poorer recall for case details.275 No systematic differences
in outcomes existed when juries reached a verdict, but there was a
slightly higher likelihood of a hung jury with twelve-person juries.276
This may well be the product of increased diversity of thought, as well
as the higher likelihood that more than one dissenter will be present
on twelve-person juries compared to six-person juries.
Social
psychological research on social influence and conformity has long
shown that a single dissenter in a group judgment is more susceptible
to pressure to conform than are pairs or other minority factions, at a
frequency much greater than dissenting proportion would predict.277
In other words, although a 210 split is proportionately equivalent to
a 15 split, the latter dissenter will much more likely succumb to the
majority group influence.
Because variety in perspectives among jury members may be partly
driven by diverse life experiences, demographic characteristics, and
social positions, the threat to jury heterogeneity posed by the sixperson jury remains a major concern for jury researchers.278 Shari
Diamond, Destiny Peery, Francis Dolan, and Emily Dolan compared
racial and ethnic heterogeneity of six-person versus twelve-person civil
juries in Cook County, Illinois where the default jury size was six, unless
a party demanded a twelve-person jury and paid the additional fees to
empanel one.279 The data were collected between 2001 and 2007,
yielding 89 six-person juries and 188 twelve-person juries that had been
selected from a venire pool that was 25% Black, 8% Latino, 63% White,
and 4% other race/ethnicity or unknown.280
Findings indicated that nearly three out of every ten six-person
juries contained no Black members and another three out of ten had
only one Black member.281 Only 2% of the twelve-person juries had no
275

Id. at 457.
Id. at 459–61 (indicating that the actual effect size under real world conditions
due to the common experimental design feature of presenting “ambiguous” cases,
rather than cases with strong evidence toward conviction or acquittal).
277
Psychologist Solomon Asch was the pioneer in-group conformity research. See
Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority Of One Against A
Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED 1 (1956). For a recent
meta-analysis of group conformity studies, see Rod Bond, Group Size and Conformity, 8
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 331 (2005).
278
See, e.g., Alisa Smith & Michael J. Saks, The Case for Overturning Williams v. Florida
and the Six-Person Jury: History, Law, and Empirical Evidence, 60 FLA. L. REV. 441 (2008).
279
Shari Seidman Diamond, Destiny Peery, Francis J. Dolan & Emily Dolan,
Achieving Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 425, 435 (2009).
280
Id.
281
Id. at 442.
276

BELL & LYNCH (DO NOT DELETE)

456

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

1/28/2016 12:29 PM

[Vol. 46:361

Black members and another 16% had just one Black member.282 Twothirds of the six-person juries included no Hispanic members; that
percentage was much lower (40%) with twelve-person juries.283 Thus,
while the selection process in this context did not further erode the
representativeness of the seated juries, these findings directly
demonstrate the increased risk of demographic homogeneity that
attends six-person juries.284
Perhaps most on point is the work by economists Anwar, Bayer,
and Hjalmarsson in Florida, described supra.285 The data in this study
indicated that 36% of the jury pools286 for the criminal trials included
no Black potential jurors, and 72% of the seated six-person juries did
not include a single Black juror.287 The disparity problem in
convictions that the researchers demonstrated was therefore
exacerbated by the widespread exclusion of Black jury members that
comes with the six-person jury.288 Thus, forty years after Zeisel issued
his warnings about the impact of Williams on the jury’s functionality
and representativeness, Anwar and her colleagues directly linked
Zeisel’s two concerns explicitly to the problem of racial disparities in
case outcomes, arguing that:
[A] potentially desirable feature of a justice system is that jury
verdicts are not arbitrary given the evidence. In this context,
increasing the number of jurors on the seated jury would
substantially reduce the variability of the trial outcomes,
increase black representation in the jury pool and on seated
juries, and make trial outcomes more equal for white and
black defendants.289

282

Id.
Id. at 444.
284
Id. at 449 (concluding that the most straightforward solution to homogeneous
juries is “a return to the 12-member jury”).
285
Anwar et al., supra note 231.
286
Id. at 1019 (the mean pool size per felony trial in the sample was twenty-seven
persons).
287
Id. at 1029 (summary statistics table).
288
Id. at 1035 (reporting a 16% gap in the rate of convictions between Blacks and
Whites when no Blacks were on the jury; the gap disappeared when there was at least
one Black juror).
289
Id. at 1049.
283
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE OF DIVERSE JURIES &
CHALLENGES TO THEIR REALIZATION
A. Jury Representativeness and the Right to Exclude
The Supreme Court has long maintained that the selection of a
jury that adequately represents the broader community is important to
both fundamental rights and democracy.290 In Taylor v. Louisiana,
Justice White noted that “the selection of a petit jury from a
representative cross section of the community is an essential
component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”291 A
representative jury, recognized by the Court for more than 100 years
as part of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment’s right to an impartial jury,
does not exclude any significant group in society.292
Over 100 years ago, a jury of one’s peers included people of
different races. One of the first cases to address the issue of a
defendant’s rights to a racially diverse jury was the 1879 case of Strauder
v. West Virginia.293 The defendant, a freed slave, sought to move his
criminal trial from state court to federal court.294 At the time, West
Virginia law excluded Blacks from serving on grand and petit juries.295
The defendant argued that the absence of Blacks from the jury
prevented him from receiving a fair trial.296 The Supreme Court
agreed and upheld his claim.297
The entitlement to a jury that represents a fair cross-section of
society has two key components. First, persons of the defendant’s own
race cannot be excluded. Second, and more broadly, even in cases in
which the defendant is, for example, a White male, minorities and
women should not be excluded from the jury pool as a matter of
fairness to the defendant.298 This has far broader implications for the
jury as an institution than does a defendant’s claim for inclusion of
jurors who look like him or her. For instance, in Taylor v. Louisiana,
the Court entertained a challenge posed by a male defendant who
argued that the Louisiana law excluding women from jury service
unless they previously filed written declaration, violated his Sixth

290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298

See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 551 U.S. 127, 142 (1994).
100 U.S. 303 (1879), abrogated on different grounds by Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522.
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 311.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 308.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 422–23 (1991).
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Amendment right to impartial jury.299 The Court agreed, highlighting
the central importance of a jury’s representativeness as a general
principle.300 A representative jury is one that attorneys select from a
pool that contains a fair cross-section of the community.301 Justice
White identified the fair-cross-section requirement as “fundamental to
the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment”302 that was violated
by the systematic exclusion of women from the jury.303
In Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
the notion of representativeness is grounded in the essential function
of juries as a democratic civic institution as we conceive of them in the
United States. In this passage from Taylor, the Court highlights the
rights of members of various community groups to participate in
juries304:
Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding
identifiable segments playing major roles in the community
cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury
trial. Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool
broadly representative of the community as well as impartial
in a specific case . . . . [T]he broad representative character
of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of a
diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the
administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.305
As the Court makes clear in the passages cited above,
representativeness of juries is critical, not just for sake of the parties in
a given case, but also to democracy itself. In the Court’s view,
restricting service to some groups and excluding others undermines
impartiality and prevents those excluded from fully participating in the
body politic.
B. The Effect of the Exclusion on Communities
Though the holdings in all of the Sixth Amendment cases have
necessarily been limited to the effect of exclusion on defendants,306 as
noted above, the Supreme Court has articulated other constitutional
values inherent in the representativeness requirement in several other

299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975).
Id. at 528.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 530–31.
Id. at 531.
See generally Taylor, 419 at 530–31.
Taylor, 419 U.S at 530–31 (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).
See id. at 522; Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 314 (2010).
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cases.307 One value, distinct from that of the defendant’s rights,
concerns the rights of potential jurors to participate in this important
civic activity.308 The Court clearly stated that nearly all members of
society are eligible by right to serve on juries.309 In other words,
excluding women and minorities from participating as jurors violates
their participatory rights, regardless of defendants’ interests.310 The
Court recognized these participatory rights as early as Strauder v. West
Virginia.311 In Strauder, the Court noted that excluding Blacks from
juries damaged not just Black defendants but also Blacks who might
participate as jurors.312 The exclusion of Blacks, according to the
Court, denies the class of potential jurors the “privilege of participating
equally . . . in the administration of justice.”313 Exclusion from jury
service also stigmatizes and is “practically a brand upon [individuals],
affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.”314
The Court has ruled that the deliberate exclusion of members of
a protected class (for instance, based on race or gender) from juries
constitutes unconstitutional discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.315 In J.E.B. v.
Alabama, the Court struck down gender-based peremptory challenges,
noting not just the harm imposed by gender-based discrimination on
the defendant and the individual juror, but also its negative impact on
the community:
Discrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or on
gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the
individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from
participation in the judicial process . . . . The community is
harmed by the State’s participation in the perpetuation of
invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of
confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned
307

Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
Id. at 530–31 (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter
J., dissenting)).
309
The exceptions include blanket exclusion of felons in jurisdictions that choose
to do so, exclusions on language ability, and those of citizen status. On the legal logic
used to justify felon exclusion, see James M. Binnall, Sixteen Million Angry Men: Reviving
a Dead Doctrine to Challenge the Constitutionality of Excluding Felons from Jury Service, 17 VA.
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2009); Brian C. Kalt, Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U.
L. REV. 65 (2003).
310
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
311
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879), abrogated on different grounds by Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522.
312
Id.
313
Id.
314
Id.
315
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 84–85 (1986).
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discrimination in the courtroom engenders.316
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor articulated the importance of
gender-based inclusion, like race-based inclusion, to the deliberative
process, intuiting what social science research has demonstrated:
“[L]ike race, gender matters . . . . [O]ne need not be a sexist to share
the intuition that in certain cases a person’s gender and resulting life
experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case. ‘Jurors are
not expected to come into the jury box and leave behind all that their
human experience has taught them.’”317
C. Jury Blaming: A Tale of Two Female Dominated Juries
As previously demonstrated, the selection of juries that adequately
represent the diverse life experiences and perspectives of the full array
of community members is a longstanding legal value. The Court has
valorized the fair cross-section requirement for its value to individual
defendants, potential jurors, and society, writ large. In contrast,
however, the public sphere has not always been so laudatory,
particularly in racially charged, controversial cases. A notable example
of such criticism existed with the jury of the O.J. Simpson case.318
Simpson, a Black actor and former professional football player, was
charged with the 1994 murders of his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson,
and her friend, Ronald Goldman.319 The jury that heard and decided
the Simpson case included eight women and four men.320 Eight of
those jurors were Black, two were Hispanic, and one was half White
and half American Indian.321 One juror was White.322
After the jury acquitted Simpson of the murders, many
commentators accused the jury of being racially biased in favor of the
316

J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. at 140 (1994). The notion of community-based
harms posed by discrimination had also been recognized by the Court in an earlier
case, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 627 (1991), where the Court
noted the effects of how discrimination in jury selection might be received.
Discrimination in the courtroom, the Court added, “raises serious questions as to the
fairness of the proceedings conducted there.” Id. at 628.
317
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148–49 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980)).
318
See, e.g., Gerald Uelman, Jury Bashing and the O.J. Simpson Verdict, 20 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 475, 475–76 (1997).
319
People v. O.J. Simpson, No. BA 097211 (Cal. Super. CL, LA. County) (Oct. 3,
1995); Kenneth B. Noble, A Jury is Chosen to Hear the Simpson Case, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 4,
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/04/us/a-jury-is-chosen-to-hearthe-simpson-murder-case.html.
320
Noble, supra note 319.
321
Id.
322
Id.
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defendant.323 The day after the verdict’s announcement, the Wall
Street Journal broadcast the jury’s verdict with the headline, “Color
Blinded,” implying that the jury’s decision had more to do with the
jury’s racial composition than the burden of proof.324 The newspaper
article assumed that the jury refused to convict Simpson because of his
race, and not because of the prosecution’s failure to provide evidence
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.325 Similar allegations of racial bias
were expressed toward the predominantly White jury that acquitted
the four police officers in 1992 for the 1991 beating of Rodney King.326
A bystander taped the beating, prompting one law professor to
comment: “Apparently, it was easy to convince a jury of [W]hite
suburbanites to disconnect their eyeballs from their brains, and not be
‘satisfied with seeing.’”327
Even though female-dominated juries heard both the Simpson
and Zimmerman cases, the jury in the Zimmerman case fared far
better in the public sphere than did the jury in the O.J. Simpson case.
In the Zimmerman case, despite a majority of the jurors being White
women, there was a rush to explain the jury’s verdict from an
evidentiary, rather than either a raced or a gendered perspective.328
After this decision, the Wall Street Journal assigned no blame for the
failure to convict Zimmerman to the jury’s demographics,
editorializing that “the state could not prove its case to the satisfaction
of the six jurors, all women, for whom the easiest decision in terms of
323
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public approval would have been to convict.”329 While the jury in this
highly publicized and closely watched case consisted entirely of
women, there was no notable criticism of the controversial verdict
framed in terms of the jury’s gender composition. What might that
tell us about how gender and race stereotypes differentially function
in the public sphere?
A variety of possible explanations exist for the media’s failure to
engage in the sort of jury blaming in the Zimmerman case that it had
done in the Simpson case. Of course, the media could possibly have
learned from past criticism and decided to accept the jury’s decision
as properly based on legal standards.330 Another rationale may be that
race is privileged over gender as a frame for explaining contested
verdicts. In other words, in both cases, media and commentators were
less concerned with the fact that women dominated the respective
juries; rather, the juries’ racial composition was at issue. The Simpson
jury was criticized not because Black women dominated it, but rather
because the majority of jurors were Black. In that vein, the Zimmerman
jury was not criticized, despite being dominated by women, because
most of the women were White.
Though the public did not criticize the Zimmerman verdict in
gendered terms, reports of the deliberations indicate that the jurors’
racial and gender identities may indeed have shaped how the jurors
understood the evidence in the case and gave it meaning.331 Principles
of intersectionality332 are best able to capture the manner in which race
and gender interact to impact juror decision-making. Intersectionality
maintains that rather than thinking that one characteristic of an
individual creates a singular, predictable experience of subordination,
characteristics like race and gender may “interact with each other . . .
and with a host of other characteristics, like age, income, occupation,
education, political affiliation, and religion, to make any one
characteristic an unreliable indicator of bias.”333
Different
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characteristics may lead to either privilege or subordination.
An intersectional approach would interrogate the jurors’
experiences not just as women, but also their experiences as either
White or non-White women, and how that then shapes their
perceptions of the case. Take for instance the gendered experience of
mothering. In this context, if gender alone was the only component
in the jury’s assessment of the Zimmerman case facts, mothering would
have perhaps predicted a different interpretation. All but one of the
jurors were mothers.334 Trayvon Martin, a slight, baby-faced, teenager,
was killed after engaging in typical teenaged behavior—going to a
convenience store to purchase snacks. Looking solely to the issue of
gender, one might have expected that the mothers on the jury might
have seen Martin as a child, and therefore might have been relatively
unsympathetic to his killer. This was not the case, however.
No window into the jury room existed to allow for a direct
observation of the deliberations.
Nevertheless, we do have
commentary offered by jurors soon after the case ended. That
commentary indicates that both race and gender informed the jury’s
reading of the case. Take for instance the remarks of Juror B37 who
self-identified as a White woman in her sixties and as a mother of two
grown children. The first juror to speak to the press, Juror B37, noted
that at the beginning of jury deliberations, three of the jurors favored
acquittal, two favored a manslaughter conviction, and one favored a
second degree murder conviction.335
Juror B37 believed that
Zimmerman’s “heart was in the right place” and thought that Martin
likely became violent first.336 This juror also used to have a gun permit
and supported Zimmerman’s right to have a gun with him the night of
the shooting.337
Intersectionality reminds us that individuals have multiple
components to their identity, which may interact to affect their
decision-making. In this case, it appears that the jurors with children
approached their decision making as mothers, and that mother
identity was racially charged as well. Thus, four out of the five mothers
viewed the case through the lens of White mothers, not mothers of
color. Martin’s race, therefore, created social distance and may have
334

The 6 Women Who Will Determine Zimmerman’s Fate, HLN (June 24, 2013),
http://www.hlntv.com/slideshow/2013/06/20/george-zimmerman-murder-trialjuror-bios.
335
Mark Mooney, George Zimmerman Juror Says His ‘Heart Was in the Right Place,’ ABC
NEWS (July 15, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/07/georgezimmerman-juror-says-his-heart-was-in-the-right-place/.
336
Id.
337
Id.

BELL & LYNCH (DO NOT DELETE)

464

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

1/28/2016 12:29 PM

[Vol. 46:361

inhibited jurors from analogizing his experience to their own children.
To the White female jurors, Martin was perhaps less likely to be seen
as childlike and more likely to be viewed as a menacing threat, a
symbolic assailant.338 In her interview with CNN’s Anderson Cooper,
Juror B37 transformed Martin from victim into the threatening
assailant, justifying her “belief” in Zimmerman’s account by inventing
Martin’s motives and actions as a violent aggressor:
Cooper: So you think, based on the testimony you heard, you
believe that Trayvon Martin was the aggressor?
Juror B37: I think the roles changed. I think, I think George
got in a little bit too deep, which he shouldn’t have been
there. But Trayvon decided he wasn’t going to let him scare
him and get the one-over, up on him, or something. And I
think Trayvon got mad and attacked him.339
Her assessment that the unarmed Martin, a teenager returning from a
snack run, was an angry aggressor suggests that she did not primarily
construct Martin through the lens of a mother. Rather, racial distance
between Juror B37 and Martin likely shaped her justification of his
homicide, “because George had a right to protect himself.”340
Intersectionality theory posits that race matters in a gendered way,
as illustrated by another juror’s, Juror B29’s, very different rendering
of the case facts and decision-making process. At the time of the trial,
Juror B29 was a thirty-six-year-old mother of eight children. Juror B29
was a Latina and the only juror of color.341 She told the media that she
felt that Zimmerman “got away with murder.”342 Juror B29 said that “in
our hearts we felt he was guilty,” but that the law and evidence did not
allow a guilty verdict.343
Her comments also highlight how she assessed this case as a
mother. Because of her status as a non-White mother, Juror B29
seemed to be able to see similarities between Martin and her own
children and similarities between herself and Martin’s mother. Juror
B29 stated:
338
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It’s hard for me to sleep, it’s hard for me to eat because I feel
I was forcefully included in Trayvon Martin’s death. And as
I carry him on my back, I’m hurting as much [as] Trayvon’s
Martin’s mother because there’s no way that any mother
should feel that pain.344
Though it is impossible to know how much the juror’s perspective
might have affected the decision in the case had other jurors shared
this view,345 Juror B29 compellingly contrasts Juror B37. Where Juror
B37 approached the killing of the unarmed Martin as justified because
of her belief that Martin likely became violent first, Juror B29 thought
that if not legally guilty, Zimmerman was morally culpable and would
have to reconcile that with God.346 Though Juror B29 believes
ultimately that the law is to blame for the jury’s acquittal of
Zimmerman, she also expressed an empathic sense of responsibility,
noting her difficulty eating and sleeping after her role as a juror in the
case that did not find Zimmerman guilty.
Though the media did not criticize the jury’s verdict in the
Zimmerman case in the same way it did the verdict in the Simpson
case, the Zimmerman verdict was not universally accepted.347 After the
verdict, protests erupted around the country. Many protesters viewed
the decision in the case as less legitimate, at least in part, because of
the absence of Black jurors. Thus, these protests were an assault on
the legitimacy of the jury as an institution, a value recognized by the
courts and validated by social science research.348 “Perceptions of
fairness and legitimacy based on the racial composition of the jury can
344
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have a measurable effect on public perceptions of the fairness of the
criminal justice system.”349
CONCLUSION
Concerns about the role that race and gender play in decisionmaking are increasingly a part of the dialogue in controversial cases.
In the two years following the Zimmerman trial, the decisions of grand
jurors charged with deciding whether charges should be filed against
officers in the police killings of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri
and Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York were announced. In both
cases, the respective grand juries declined to indict the officers. Both
cases highlight the challenge to the legitimacy of our criminal justice
system when White authorities kill Black civilians and are not held
criminally responsible. The law keeps the identity of grand jurors a
secret, but the racial breakdown of the jurors charged with hearing the
case against Officer Darren Wilson—three Black members and nine
White members—was quickly revealed.350 While this body did look like
the countywide pool from which it was drawn, it did not look like
Ferguson, the site of inquiry, where 67.4% of the 21,000 residents are
Black and only 29.3% are White.351 Staten Island, where the grand jury
declined to indict the police officer who used the chokehold that led
to the death of Eric Garner, did not release the racial and gender
composition of the grand jury.352 These cases did not even survive the
first, lower threshold of probable cause to be able to move forward to
a public adjudication process; even if they had, the past suggests that
prospects for holding the defendants criminally responsible would be
poor.353
These kinds of cases represent the flip-side of the problem
identified in Batson v. Kentucky: Black defendants have a right to diverse
349
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juries that do not exclude members on the basis of race.354 In Batson,
the remedy is directed at prosecutors who use their peremptory
challenges to exclude venire members on the basis of their race.
Specifically, under Batson, the defendant must first make a prima facie
case that the prosecutor is striking jurors on the basis of racial
identity.355 Second, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to “come
forward with a neutral explanation for challenging Black jurors.”356
Finally, “the trial court then will have the duty to determine if the
defendant has established purposeful discrimination.”357
Cases like Zimmerman’s pit the values and mandates of the fair
cross-section doctrine for the broader community directly against the
individual defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. In Georgia v.
McCollum, the Court affirmed the broader community value of diverse
juries by ruling that the Constitution prohibits race-based exclusions,
even if exercised by the defendant in furtherance of his rights.358 The
Court specifically authorized prosecutors to make Batson challenges
when they perceive the defense is striking jurors because of their race
or gender.359
On both sides of this problem, the remedy has been woefully
inadequate and highlights the large gap between the principles of
Batson and the social psychological realities in which Batson challenges
operate.360 If we maintain an expanded view of the fair cross-section
requirement—that it is necessary for the broader community and for
democratic ideals—we might reconstitute the mechanisms for
achieving appropriately diverse juries from the individual challenge to
policy mandates. The language from Strauder and other cases suggests
a constitutional avenue exists to broaden how we conceive of the value
of a fair cross-section in the context of juries by a more expansive
consideration of how this democratic institution functions to reinforce
legal legitimacy.361 Communities have a clear stake in having a fair
354
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cross-section of the community participate in jury decisions to help
ensure that the broader community accepts those decisions as
legitimate.
How might this be operationalized? First, in recognition of the
distinct obligations of prosecutors in criminal cases to serve the
interests of justice and represent the communities in which they work,
prosecutors might be required to affirmatively seat a jury that
adequately represents the community from which it is drawn. Thus,
rather than treating jury selection as a purely adversarial process,
whereby each side must mount challenges if a suspicious pattern of
exclusion arises, the prosecutor may be called upon to demonstrate
how each decision furthers the fair cross-section imperative. This
might be included in Rule 3.8 of the American Bar Association’s Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which outlines the “Special
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,”362 and serves as a model for
professional responsibility adopted by most states. It might also be
incorporated in the ABA standards for the prosecutorial function in
jury selection, under Standard 3-5.3.363
Second, taking the lessons from the social science scholarship on
the causes and consequences of non-diverse juries, a reconsideration
of the policy value, if not the constitutionality, of the six-person jury is
critical.364 Evidence strongly suggests that six-person juries are
significantly more likely to result in homogeneous composition than
twelve-person juries.365 Anwar et al.’s analysis of criminal trials in
Florida provides dramatic evidence of the cost to fairness for
defendants of color under a six-person jury system. As Diamond,
Peery, Dolan and Dolan conclude: “If increasing diversity in order to
better represent the population is a goal worth pursuing for the U.S.
jury, the straightforward solution—the key—is a return to the 12member jury.”366
Third, as a matter of policy, jurisdictions should implement
“affirmative jury selection” practices whereby minority communities
are oversampled in the issuance of jury summons and then reconfigure the selection process to focus on the creation of a diverse
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and inclusive seated jury.367 Thus, this would be coupled at the
selection stage with the ethical mandate to prosecutors to serve the
community by furthering the representative cross-section ideals.
If the approach to jury selection followed these principles, what
would the Zimmerman jury have looked like? The Zimmerman jury
was comprised of five White women and one Hispanic woman.368
Though the overall pool may have reflected the diversity of the
community, the six-person jury seated in the case did not. Zimmerman
lived in the Retreat at Twin Lakes,369 which was not an all-White
community. In fact, the Retreat at Twin Lakes was fairly diverse. The
zip code in which the neighborhood was located contained a mix of
residents: 20% Black, 20% Hispanic, 50% White.370 The overall
community from which the jury pool was drawn was a diverse one as
well.371 Sanford is in Seminole County, which is composed of 52%
women, 64% White, 19% Hispanic, 12% Black.372 Given the county
demographics, a twelve-person jury should have included six men, at
least one Black member, two Hispanic members, and no more than
eight White members. Had it more accurately reflected a fair crosssection of the community, the outcome may well have been different.
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